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INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 1994, in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America,' the United States Supreme Court struck down the National
Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or "the Board") supervisory status
test for charge nurses, thereby endangering the collective bargaining
and organizational rights of nurses as well as all professionals.2
Although the supervisory test was a reasonable agency interpretation
of an ambiguous statutory phrase-an interpretation supported by
legislative history and the policies underlying the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act")-the textualist-minded Supreme
Court refused to consider any extrinsic evidence, instead focusing
exclusively on the phrase's literal meaning.' Because of the textualist
method used to resolve the statutory issue, the Health Care decision
has dramatic implications both within and far beyond the labor law
arena.
This Comment illustrates why decisions like Health Care present a
clear and growing threat to all federal administrative agencies. The
increasing use of textualism, which largely disregards legislative
history, as the preferred method of statutory interpretation is the
antithesis of Chevron deference.4 In its extreme form, textualism
1. 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
2. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1782-85 (1994)
(striking down "incidental to patient care" test by using textualist approach in construing terms
"in the interest of the employer"); infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing
predicted effects of decision).
3. See infra notes 46-117, 250-64 and accompanying text (discussing NLRB's test and
Court's restrictive approach to statutory interpretation in Health Care).
4. See infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron deference as the
proper amount of leeway a federal court is to give administrative agency interpretations of
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threatens to violate the separation of powers doctrine. If left
unchecked, the unpredictable and haphazard nature of textualism will
exact great financial, economic, and social costs, wreaking havoc in an
already less-than-efficient federal administrative system. Prompt action
is needed to stop the spread of this destructive form of statutory
interpretation. As Judge Patricia Wald has warned:
The issue of whether and how to use legislative history in determin-
ing the meaning of statutes ought to be a pressing concern to all
of us who care about how laws are made and interpreted; it
implicates the respective roles of legislators and judges in our
constitutional system. We need to worry about it .....
This Comment also elucidates the importance of the Health Care
decision to the labor law arena. Because the case profoundly affects
the status of professionals, it deserves special attention. Although
during the past twenty years the overall proportion of workers in
unions has dramatically decreased, the number of professional
workers in unions has increased substantially.6 Some analysts view
professional employees as the last hope to reinvigorate the American
labor movement.' Additionally, Health Care serves as another
example of the inherent tension between the NLRA's definitions of
supervisor and professional.8 This Comment demonstrates that
under current law, the NLRB's supervisory status test for charge
nurses was a rational decision, well within the NLRB's power to
implement and squarely based on prior case law and the NLRA's
legislative history. Any correction of the NLRB's "incidental to patient
care" supervisor status test should have come from Congress and not
from the Supreme Court and its questionable textualist approach.
This Comment illustrates how the Supreme Court's decision will affect
all professionals despite Justice Kennedy's prediction that the Health
Care decision will affect only the nursing industry.9 Finally, this
statutory language).
5. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper The Use of Lgislative Histoy in Construing Statutes
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Cour 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 279 (1990).
6. See David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by
Professional Employees?, 99 YALE LJ. 689, 690 & n.1 (1990) (discussing professional workers'
increased union membership and their vital role in labor movement).
7. See id.; see also Robert L. Aronson, Unionism Among Professional Emploees in the Private
Sector, 38 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 352, 361-62 (1985) (concluding that unionism among private
professionals has grown more rapidly than generally assumed, but that overall number of
unionized professionals is relatively small).
8. See infra Part IA.
9. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1785 (1994)
("Because the Board's interpretation of 'in the interest of the employer' is for the most part
confined to nurse cases, our decision will have almost no effect outside that context. Any
parade of horribles about the meaning of this decision for employees in other industries is thus
quite misplaced....").
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Comment reveals that the NLRB's new supervisory status test for
charge nurses is fraught with problems.
Part I of this Comment traces the development of the Board's
"incidental to patient care" test and examines the legislative history
and case law on which it is based. Part II relates how the Sixth
Circuit, by applying a textualist interpretation, struck down the test.
Part III examines the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the Sixth
Circuit's ruling. Part IV analyzes how and why the NLRB's test was
invalidated and illuminates the larger ramifications of the Court's
approach. In Part V, the NLRB's new test is examined and critiqued.
Finally, Part VI offers several recommendations in the form of
legislative amendments to counter the deference-deteriorating effects
of textualism.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "INCIDENTAL TO PATIENT CARE" TEST
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act"° to curb the
impairment of commerce attendant upon labor disputes and to give
most employees legal protection to freely associate, organize, and
bargain collectively "for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.""
Through the NLRA, Congress created the NLRB, the administrative
agency in charge of ensuring that employees' organizational rights are
protected and that employers are free from unnecessary industrial
strife.
12
The NLRA, however, does not protect all types of employees.
Workers who are closely aligned with management and deemed
to possess managerial, 3  confidential, 14  or supervisory sta-
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). Originally enacted as the Wagner Act in 1935, ch. 372,
49 Star. 451, the Act was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, to
correct the perceived imbalance of power that it created in favor of employees. See 93 CONG.
REc. 3521, 3535 (1947).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
12. See id. §§ 151, 153 (listing polices of NLRA and duties of NLRB).
13. SeeNLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,682 (1980) (holding that managerial employees
are so obviously excluded from Act's protection that express exclusion is not needed); NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-89 (1974) (holding that because managerial employees
formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative decisions of
their employers, they are excludable from NLRA); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320, 323 & n.4 (1947).
14. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177-92
(1981) (approving Board's denial of protection to confidential employees who satisfy "labor
nexus" test); B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.LR.B. 722, 724 (1956) (defining confidential employee
as one who formulates, determines, or effectuates management policies in field of labor
relations); see also David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals
UndertheNLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1775, 1796 n.88 (1989) (discussing treatment of confidential
employees in Taft-Hartley legislative history).
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tus15 are stripped of the Act's protections. Therefore, a threshold
status determination is necessary to determine one's coverage under
the NLRA.
A. Supervisory Status under the National Labor Relations Act
Originally, the NLRA did not contain an exclusion for employees
who acted as supervisors. 6 NLRB holdings in cases addressing
supervisory status determinations oscillated between inclusion and
exclusion."7 In the 1947 decision Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,'8
the Supreme Court confronted the difficult issue of whether to afford
the Act's protections to employees who acted as supervisors. In
upholding the NLRB's decision to certify a bargaining unit of
foremen, 9 the Court rejected the employer's contention that the
foremen were excluded from organizing because the Act's definition
of employer included anyone who acted in the "interest of the
employer."2 The Court reasoned that the phrase, as used in section
2(2) of the NLRA, did not demarcate various types of employees
because "[e]very employee, from the very fact of employment in the
master's business, is required to act in his interest."' The Court
noted that this phrase was present in section 2 (2) merely to ensure
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (stating that "employee" does not include any individual
employed as a "supervisor," thus making the two mutually exclusive for purposes of the Act's
protections).
16. See Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 450, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1994)) (extending labor rights to all employees except those who are "employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse," but not creating an exclusion for those working
as supervisors).
17. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,277 (1974) (citing and discussing NLRB's
inconsistent decisions during time period before Taft-Hartley Act); see also Rabban, supra note
14, at 1783 & n.18 (acknowledging Board's struggle with exclusion of supervisory employees).
18. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
19. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947). The Supreme Court
noted that unlike other employees, the foremen were in charge of maintaining the quantity and
quality of production. See id. at 487. Further, the foremen were authorized to discipline other
employees by applying penalties and initiating recommendations for promotion and demotion.
See id.
20. Id. at 488-89 (discussing employer's argument and Act's original definition of employer
at § 2(2)). The employers argued that the language of section 2(2) "reads foreman out of the
employee class and into the class of employers." Id. at 488. Employers were concerned with the
inherent conflicts in loyalty a supervisor would face if allowed to organize under a union,
thereby swearing allegiance to the union. See Rabban, supra note 14, at 1785 & nn.27-32
(discussing views of those who oppose allowing supervisors to organize).
21. Packard, 330 U.S. at 488. The Court explained its comment by stating that the
employee owes to the employer faithful performance of service, protection of the employer's
property, and a duty to act in the employer's interest in relation to third parties. See id. at 489.
These statements were later heavily relied on by the Court in Health Carm See NLRB v. Health
Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1782 (1994) (rejecting NRLB's interpretation
that nursing supervisory activity is not acting in employer's interest as inconsistent with Packard).
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that the courts would apply the tort principle of respondeat superior
to employers whose agents had committed unfair labor practices
under the Act.22
Justice Douglas, writing for the dissent, poignantly illustrated the
fallacies inherent in the majority's opinion.23 He argued that the
Act separated the two warring camps of management and labor by
defining who is to be considered an employer and who is to be
deemed an employee.24 Because the Act defined an employer not
only as that person who actually owned the company but also as "any
person who acted in the interest of the employer," the phrase was
meant to distinguish between certain workers.25 The Act was created
solely to address labor relations, not to create a new system of
vicarious liability for those involved in industry.26
Justice Douglas emphasized that the Act's employer category
encompassed all those workers who formulate and execute labor
policy,27 thereby excluding them from the Act's protections." The
focus, said Justice Douglas, must be whether the worker represents or
acts for management on labor policy matters.29
22. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 489.
23. See id. at 493-501 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Act on its face seems to classify the
operating group of industry into two classes; what is included in one group is excluded from the
other."). Justice Douglas found no evidence that one personnel group may be both employers
and employees as the majority's rationale would necessitate. See id. at 495-96 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it does not make sense to say that every employee while on duty
performing her job is employer in statutory sense).
25. See id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (relating that term "employee" is used in
opposition to term "employer," which is defined specifically to encompass more individuals than
just actual owners of the company).
26. See id. at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. See id. (Douglas,J, dissenting) (citingWalterL. Daykin, The Status of Supervisoy Employees
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 IOWA L. REV. 297 (1943)); see a/SOJOSEPH ROSENFARB,
THE NATIONAL ]LABOR POLICY AND How IT WoRKs 54-56, 116-20 (1940); TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, How COLLECrIVE BARGAINING WORKS: A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE IN LEADING AMERICAN
INDUSTRIES, 512-14, 547, 557-58, 628, 780 (1942).
28. See Packard 330 U.S. at 496-501 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing reasons why
supervisory employees are not protected by Act). Justice Douglas noted that in addition to the
apparent meaning of the phrase, other important factors supported his interpretation. See id.
at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting). If foremen had a dual status of employer and employee, it
would create serious conflicting loyalties and would be "one of the most important and
conspicuous problems." Id. at 498 (Douglas,J., dissenting). The failure of Congress to address
such a glaring problem suggests that it never intended to bring supervisors under the Act's
protection in the first instance. See id. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also
noted that when Congress decided to include managerial and supervisory workers within the
category of employees in other statutes, it did so expressly. Congress' failure to do the same
with the NLRA, therefore, carries some significance. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 500 (Douglas,J, dissenting) (clarifying that although he used terms foreman
and supervisor synonymously, employee's actions in connection with management and its labor
policies will determine worker's actual category).
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Congress responded quickly to the Packard decision by enacting the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which expressly excluded supervisors from
the Act's coverage."0 The main purpose of the amendment was to
avoid the problem of "divided loyalties" that would exist if supervisors
were afforded the Act's protections to bargain collectively and tojoin
unions.3 Specifically, Congress sought to avoid the imbalance of
power in the collective bargaining process that would result if unions
could exert control over supervisory personnel who traditionally have
been treated as part of management and have been thought to owe
undivided loyalty to management in the implementation and
execution of its labor policies.
3 2
The Act's definition of "supervisor" comes from the Senate's version
of the legislation. 3 This version omitted several categories of
employees that the House had included in its version because the
Senate sought to protect employees with "minor supervisory duties"
as distinguished from those with "genuine management preroga-
tives." 4 The Act, in final form, defines a supervisor as
30. See Taft-Harley Act, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11) (1994)).
31. SeeS. REP. No. 80-105, at 3 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 16 (1947).
32. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 3-4 (discussing upset in balance of power in collective
bargaining process by unions' ability to organize supervisory personnel); H.R. REP. No. 80-245,
at 16 (maintaining that supervisors are management people and do not need the 'security' that
collective action would provide); 93 CONG. REC. 5014 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball) (stating
that such divided loyalties would prove harmful to free-enterprise system); id. at 3836 (statement
of Sen. Taft) (opining that allowing supervisors to organize would result in disruption of both
discipline and productivity of industrial workers); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 279-83 (1974) (relating purpose behind supervisory exclusion).
The House Report reveals that Congress also was concerned with not subjecting supervisors
to the "leveling processes of seniority, uniformity, and standardization" inherent in unionism.
H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 16-17. It viewed supervisors as motivated, ambitious, and talented
individuals who worked hard to move up through the rank and file, abandoning "collective
security" because opportunities with management appeared more attractive than maintaining
such security. See id.; see also BellAerospace, 416 U.S. at 281-82 n.11 (discussing Congress' reasons
for excluding supervisors).
33. See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 4 (discussing Act's definition of supervisor); see also NLRB v.
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,181-84 (1981) (discussing Senate
bill's more limited definition of supervisor).
34. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 3-4. The committee stated:
In drawing an amendment to meet this situation, the committee has not been
unmindful of the fact that certain employees with minor supervisory duties have
problems which may justify their inclusion in that act. It has therefore distinguished
between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees,
on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such genuine management
prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations
with respect to such action.
Id at 4; see Brief for Respondent, 1993 WL 625966, at *14, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (No. 92-1964) (discussing legislative history pertinent to
definition of supervisor under NLRA); see also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279-83 (providing
detailed discussion of differences between House and Senate bills' language pertaining to
definition of supervisor); Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.RB. 491,491 (1993) (discussing Taft-Hartley
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any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independentjudgment
To be a supervisor under the Act, therefore, one must: (1) exercise
authority in the interest of the employer; (2) use independent
judgment; and (3) perform any one of the twelve functions listed in
the definition. 6
From the outset, numerous courts recognized that, in light of
Congress' legislative reversal of the Packard decision, 7 the term "in
the interest of the employer" clearly meant more than what was
afforded by a "sheerly literal reading of section 2 (11)."' The courts
Amendments' legislative history); see also Rabban, supra note 14, at 1796 & nn.85-86 (discussing
legislative history surrounding Taft-Hartley Amendments).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
36. See id. The Board also looks to the secondary non-dispositive indicia of supervisor-to-
worker ratios and the identification of the highest authority present in assessing the likelihood
that certain individuals are supervisors. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 498-500 (discussing
Board's use of secondary indicia); Northwoods Manor, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 854, 855 (1982)
(utilizing secondary indicia of ratio); Flexi-Van Serv. Ctr., 228 N.L.R.B. 956, 960 (1977)
(discussing secondary criteria); McAlester Hosp. Found., 233 N.L.R.B. 589, 589-90 (1977)
(utilizing secondary indicia of ratio and highest person in charge).
The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits also give considerable weight to these secondary
factors. SeeBeverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1555 (6th Cir. 1992) (utilizing secondary
indicia of ratio and highest person in charge); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1468 (7th
Cir. 1983) (utilizing secondary indicia of ratio); NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, 690 F.2d 1062, 1067-
68 (4th Cir. 1982) (using highest person in charge as indicia of supervisory status); see also Beverly
Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 499-500 (discussing use of secondary indicia by circuit courts).
37. SeeTaft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); see also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 278
(stating that Taft-Hartley Act was "subsequent legislative reversal of Packard decision"); S. REP.
No. 80-105, at 3-4 (discussing reasons for amendments); H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 3-5 (same).
But see Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1783 (stating that when statute changes result reached by
judicial decision it does not automatically follow that statute changes meaning of language
interpreted in that decision (citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168
(1989))).
38. NLRB v. Master Stevedores Ass'n, 418 F.2d 140, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1969) (relating that
because entire work force, from company president to messenger boy, in one sense acts "in the
interest of the employer," some other test was surely contemplated); see also Food Store
Employees Union Local 347 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing meaning
of phrase "in the interest of the employer" as used in NLRA definition of supervisor); NLRB v.
Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that supervisory
exclusion requires "real power," and "meaningful action" with respect to statutory test, so that
person in question is in effect part of management); NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print
Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1958) (stating that when determining supervisory status
of worker, court must look to see if worker shares power of management); NLRB v. Quincy Steel
Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293, 296 (1st Cir. 1952) (stating that court cannot rely on label given to
employee, but must look to see if person has exercised duties in such a way as to evidence
sharing power of management); NLRB v. Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F.2d 620, 625 (1st Cir. 1952)
(stating that to be statutory supervisor worker must have genuine power to perform supervisory
function and be clothed with real power to discipline and to direct responsibly).
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reasoned that Congress, when defining the term supervisor, intended
to exclude only supervisory personnel truly regarded as part of
management and not all employees an employer invests with any one
of the twelve statutory authorities of section 2(11)." Noting that the
responsibilities enumerated in the definition of supervisor are capable
of "infinite possible variations,"40 the courts concluded that Congress
intended that the phrase "in the interest of the employer" modify the
twelve functions, requiring "meaningful action"4" to be exercised in
regard to those enumerated functions. Some courts characterized the
phrase to require "genuine power,"42 "real power,"43 or the posses-
sion of "true managerial type responsibility."' According to these
courts, Congress intended that only those who undertake to formulate
and execute labor policy and share the power of management-'
should be deemed supervisors.
B. Emergence of the "Incidental to Patient Care" Test
It was not until 1967, after jurisdiction was extended to for-profit
hospitals and nursing homes,46 that the NLRB considered the Act's
39. See Food Store, 422 F.2d at 690 (rejecting literal reading as to Congress' intent);
International Union of United Brewery Workers v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(stating that Congress surely contemplated more than what literal meaning of § (2) 11 reveals).
40. Food Store, 422 F.2d at 690; see also International Union of United Brewery Workers, 298 F.2d
at 303 (discussing existence of multitude of variations of§ 2(11)'s enumerated responsibilities).
41. See Security Guard, 384 F.2d at 147-48 (stating that to be supervisor one must exercise
.meaningful action" with respect to statutory test); International Union of United Brewery Workers,
298 F.2d at 303 (noting that supervisors act "in the interest of the employer" only when they
take "meaningful action with respect to the statutory tests").
42. See Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F.2d at 625 (stating that true supervisor must have genuine
power to perform statutory supervisory functions).
43. See it.
44. See International Union of United Brewery Workers, 298 F.2d at 303 (stating that statutory
supervisor must possess true managerial power).
45. See id. (discussing Congress' intent); NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, Inc.,
257 F.2d at 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1958). In making this determination, the Fourth Circuit took
language from Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Packard. See Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 500 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 18-29 and
accompanying text (discussing Packard decision). The language is consistent. with Justice
Ginsburg's comments in her dissenting opinion in Health Care. See NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1792 n.15 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(questioning majority's reliance on Packard decision in light of Congress' legislative reversal of
that case through Taft-Hartley amendments and concluding that proper focus should be on
Justice Douglas' dissent in Packard). But see ida t 1783 (stating that when statute changes result
reached by judicial decision it does not automatically follow that statute changes meaning of
language interpreted in that decision (citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S.
158, 168 (1989))).
46. See Butte Med. Props., 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967) (overruling Flatbush Gen. Hosp.,
126 N.L.R.B. 144 (1960), and extendingjurisdiction to proprietary hospitals); University Nursing
Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 264 (1967) (assertingjurisdiction over for-profit nursing homes).
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supervisory test in relation to "charge nurses."47 A charge nurse is
"responsible for seeing that ... medicines are administered to the
patients, that the proper charts are kept, and that the patients receive
whatever treatment has been prescribed."4s Because either a regis-
tered nurse ("RN") ,4' a professional employee, or a licensed practical
nurse ("LPN")," a technical employee, can be a charge nurse, the
determination of supervisory status in the charge nurse context
necessarily implicates both section 2(12) of the Act, which contains an
express congressional mandate that professional employees not be
automatically excluded from the Act's protection,51 and the Board's
47. See Abingdon Nursing Ctr., 189 N.L.RB. 842, 850 (1971) (defining term "charge
nurse"), enforced, No. 71-1746, 1972 WL 3050 (7th Cir.June 27, 1972).
48. Id.
49. Registered nurses are considered "professional employees" entitled to protection under
the NLRA. See Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951 (1970) (commenting that
registered nurses are highly trained group of professionals). See generally John F. Gillespie,
Annotation, Who Are Professional Emplyees Within Meaning of National Labor Relations Act?, 40
A.L.R. FED. 25 (1978) (discussing determination of professional employees).
50. Licensed practical nurses are not professionals, but rather they are technical employees
as defined by the Board. See Beverly Enters., 275 N.L.R.B. 943, 945 (1985) (holding that LPNs
are technical employees); Beverly Enters., 264 N.L.R.B. 966,966 & n.4 (1982) (stating that LPNs
are not professionals because they do not meet strict requirements of Act, but that they do
possess technical skill and use independentjudgrment); Clarion Osteopathic Community Hosp.,
219 N.L.R.B. 248, 248-49 (1975) (placing LPNs in technical employee bargaining unit); Barnert
Mem'l Hosp. Ctr., 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 780-81 (1975) (deciding that LPNs fit properly into
technical employee category); Valley Hosp., Ltd., 220 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1342 (1975) (holding that
LPNs are not professionals); see also NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983)
(stating that LPNs "if not full-fledged professionals [are] at least sub-professionals").
51. See29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994) (defining term "professional employee"); Rabban, supra
note 14, at 1792-94 (distinguishing professionals from other employees). See generally Gillespie,
supra note 49 (discussing determination of professional employees).
The Act defines a professional employee as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii)
of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual
instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing
related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to
become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12). The Taft-Hartley Amendments, by excluding supervisors and including
professionals, created significant ambiguities because both supervisors and professionals use
independent judgment in their work. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 692 (1980)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[T]he statute evidences significant tension as to congressional intent
in this respect by its explicit inclusion, on the one hand, of 'professional employees' under
§ 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), and its exclusion, on the other, of 'supervisors' under § 2(11), 29
U.S.C. § 152(11)."); NLRB v. Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d 616, 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing tension
in NLRA with regard to supervisors and professionals); Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1465 (discussing
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definition of technical workers.52 Merely because professional RNs
and technical LPNs possess expertise and exercise independent
judgment, they should not lose the protection of the NLRA. Thus,
in order to carry out its statutory mandate, the Board had to make a
determination as to when professionals and technicals exercise
independent judgment and direct subordinates based on their
professional or technical expertise and when they exercise indepen-
dent judgment based on supervisory authority. 3
Between 1967 and 1974, the Board decided numerous charge nurse
cases, generally determining that the charge nurses in question
were not supervisors. 4  The rationales presented in the cases
tension between definition of supervisor with regard to professionals who have some supervisory
authority "in the sense of directing another's work-the lawyer his secretary, the teacher his
teacher's aide, the doctor his nurses, the registered nurse her nurse's aid, and so on");
Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing tension in
NLRA); Matthew W. Finken, The Supervisory Status of Professional Employees, 46 FoRDHAM L. REV.
805, 829-30 (1977) (noting tension and NLRB's highly porous test to resolve such tension);
Rabban, supra note 14, at 1794 (discussing ambiguities created by Taft-Hartley Amendments).
The Board bears the burden of developing rules that avoid the conflicts of interest triggered
by including true supervisors, as in Packard, but protect "employees with minor supervisory
duties." See Brief for Petitioner, 1993 WL 625967, at *16, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (No. 92-1964) (explaining Board's responsibilities (citing
S. REP. No. 80-105, at 4 (1947))).
Judicial review of Board decisions is highly deferential and is restricted to assuring that the
rulings are rational and consistent with the statute. SeeNLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,
494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990) (stating that NLRB has primary responsibility for developing and
applying national labor policy and that Board rules are accorded considerable deference); Fall
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987) ("If the Board adopts a rule
that is rational and consistent with the Act... then the rule is entitled to deference from the
courts."). The Board has "a large measure of informed discretion" when determining if there
is sufficient authority to direct responsibly the work of others to necessitate a finding of
supervisory status. SeeMarine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 179 n.6
(1962) (providing summary of many federal decisions concerning statutory definition of
supervision (citing NLRB v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561, 563 (1st Cir. 1961))).
52. See Meriter Hosp., Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 598, 598 (1992) (finding that LPNs are technical
employees); ITT Grinnell, 253 N.L.R.B. 584, 585 (1980) (defining technical employees in
industrial setting); Barnett Mem'l Hosp. Ctr., 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 780-81 (1975) (finding that
LPNs are technical employees); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1019-20
(1971) (defining technical employee/craftsman); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 46, 47
(1968) (same).
The Board defines technical employees as those "who do not meet the strict requirements
of the term 'professional employee' as defined in the Act but whose work is of a technical
nature involving the use of independent judgment and requiring the exercise of specialized
training usually acquired in colleges or technical schools or through special courses." Litton
Indus., 125 N.L.R.B. 722, 724-25 (1959). "Technical employees occupy a high prestige status
distinct from other categories of non-professional employees because of the training
requirements for their jobs." Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 284
N.L.RIB. 1516, 1553 (1987) (reprinting 29 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1987)).
53. SeeBeverly Enters., 313 N.L.RB. 491,492 (1993) (discussing Board's task in determining
how independent judgment is exercised).
54. See Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, 183 N.L.R.B. at 951-52 (drawing distinction between nurses
who exercise authority as product of professional duties and those who are vested with true
supervisory authority such as power to affectjob and pay status); Sherewood Enters., Inc., 175
N.L.R.B. 354, 354 (1969) (finding that "registered nurses are a highly trained group of
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varied." Often, when the nurse in question was an LPN, the Board
concluded that the nurse's actions were not performed with indepen-
dent judgment, thereby excluding the nurse from the statutory
definition of supervisor.56 When the nurse was an RN, the Board
professionals who normally inform other, lesser skilled, hospital employees as to the work to be
performed for patients," but that "their duties and authority in this regard are solely a product
of their highly developed professional skills and do not constitute an exercise of supervisory
authority in the interest of their employers"); see also Pikeville Investors, 204 N.L.R.B. 425, 426
(1973) (finding that LPNs did not exercise independentjudgment); Leisure Hills Health Ctrs.,
Inc., 203 N.L.RB. 326, 326 (1973) ("[W]hile the LPNs on occasion direct and assign work to
aides, the record does not show that they do so in a manner requiring the exercise of
independent judgment, but that such directions and assignments are made pursuant to
established procedures or are directed by the needs of patients."); Madeira Nursing Ctr., 203
N.L.R.B. 323, 324 (1973) (finding that RNs and LPNs who issued work assignments to aides were
not supervisors because independentjudgment was not required as assignments either were in
accord with scheduling issued by director of nursing or were dictated by needs of patient);
Garden of Eden Nursing Home, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 16, 23-24 (1972) (finding nurses' directions
were routine in nature); Jackson Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 892, 896 (1972)
(holding that LPNs did not utilize specialized skill orjudgment and had no authority over any
other employees when moving patients, cleaning them, taking them to bathroom, etc., and that,
therefore, LPNs were not supervisors); Abingdon Nursing Ctr., 189 N.L.R.B. 842, 850 (1971)
(holding that LPN who merely followed instructions of Director of Nursing written out
beforehand when acting as charge nurse and who had no authority to call in replacements was
similar to leadwomen, but did not approach level of supervisory authority within meaning of
Act); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 191 N.L.RB. 35, 39, 41 (1971) (finding that
LPN who performed perfunctory duties was not supervisor within meaning of Act), enforced, 477
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973); Diversified Health Servs., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 461, 461-62 (1969)
(holding that registered nurses who assigned work to aides were not supervisors because they
did not delegate work in manner requiring exercise of independent judgment); New Fern
Restorium Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 871, 871 (1969) (holding that authority exercised by LPNs over
aide was not exercised in manner that required independent judgment). But see North Dade
Hosp., Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 588, 592 (1974) (holding that LPNs were supervisors because they
could effectively evaluate and recommend discharge of aides); Garrard Convalescent Home, Inc.,
199 N.L.R.B. 711, 716 (1972) (holding that LPN with power to hire and fire was supervisor),
enforced, 489 F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1974); Rockville Nursing Ctr., 193 N.L.RB. 959, 962 (1971)
(holding that nurse was supervisor because of power to direct); Autumn Leaf Lodge, 193
N.L.RB. 638, 638-39 (1971) (finding that LPN was supervisor because she had power to grant
time off and effectively recommend discharge), enforced mem. sub nom. NLRB v. National Living
Ctr., Inc., 462 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1972); Rosewood, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 193, 194 (1970) (finding
that charge nurses were supervisors because of ability to discipline and effectively recommend
wage increases).
55. Compare Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, 183 N.L.R.B. at 951-52 (drawing distinction between
nurses who exercise duties and authority as product of professional duties and those who are
vested with true supervisory authority), uith Jackson Manor Nursing Home, 194 N.L.R.B. at 896
(holding that LPNs did not utilize specialized skill or judgment and had no authority over any
other employees when attending to patients and, therefore, were not supervisors), and
Convalescent Ctr. of Honolulu, 180 N.L.R.B. 461,461-62 (1969) (finding that RNs who assigned
work to aides were not supervisors because they did not do so in manner requiring exercise of
independentjudgment). In addition to the two rationales used above, the Board also may use
a combination of the two. See Madeira Nursing Cr., 203 N.L.R.B. at 324 (finding that LPNs and
RNs who issued work assignments to aides were not supervisors because these tasks did not
require independent judgment but rather either were in accord with scheduling issued by
director of nursing or were dictated by needs of patient).
56. See Pikeville Investors, 204 N.L.R.B. at 426 (stating that nurses' actions were routine);
Leisure Hills Health Ctrs., 203 N.L.R.B. at 326-27 (finding that nurses performed only regular
duties; any non-routine problem was referred to supervisors); Garden of Eden Nursing Home, 199
N.L.R.B. at 23-24 (finding that actions of nurse were routine in nature); Abingdon Nursing Ctr.,
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drew a distinction between those nurses who directed aides on the
basis of the RN's highly developed professional skills, which it
concluded did not constitute an exercise of supervisory authority in
the interest of the employer, and those nurses who, in addition to
their professional duties, possessed the authority to make effective
recommendations as to job status and pay. 7 Thus, the exercise of
authority over nonprofessional employees simply could be a "manifes-
tation of an RN's professional skill and training," not an exercise of
supervisory power in the interest of the employer.
58
C. NLRA Amendments of 1974
In 1974, Congress passed the "Health Care Amendments" to the
NLRA, extending Board jurisdiction to non-profit hospitals. 9
During the hearings concerning the amendments, the American
Nurses Association ("ANA") urged Congress to exempt expressly
health care professionals from the Act's definition of supervisor,
6
0
fearing that if a broad interpretation of the term supervisor devel-
189 N.L.RB. at 850 (holding that LPN who merely followed instructions of Director of Nursing
written out beforehand did not approach level of supervisory authority within meaning of Act);
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 191 N.L.R.B. at 39, 41 (finding that LPN who
performed perfunctory duties was not supervisor within meaning of Act); Convalscent Ctr. of
Honolulu, 180 N.L.R.B. at 461-62 (holding that registered nurses who assigned work to aides were
not supervisors because they did not do so in manner requiring exercise of independent
judgment); New Fern Restorium Co., 175 N.LR.B. at 871-72 (holding that authority exercised by
LPNs over aide was not exercised in manner that required independent judgment).
57. See Sherewood Enters., 175 N.L.R.B. at 354. The Board found:
Registered nurses are a highly trained group of professionals who normally inform
other, lesser skilled, hospital employees as to the work to be performed for patients,
but.., their duties and authority in this regard are solely a product of their highly
developed professional skills and do not constitute an exercise of supervisory authority
in the interest of their employer.
Id.
58. See Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, 193 N.L.R.B. 833, 833-35 (1971) (drawing distinction
between nurses who exercise authority as product of professional duties and those who are
vested with true supervisory authority such as power to affectjob and pay status (citing Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 163 N.L.R1B. 723, 726-27 (1967))); Doctors'Hosp. of Modesto, 183 N.L.R.B. at
951-52, 957 (same).
59. See National Labor Relations Act Amendments of 1974 ("Health Care Amendments"),
Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 1 (a), (b), 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994)).
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated:
The National Labor Relations Act governs the collective bargaining relationship of
millions of workers including employees of proprietary hospitals, proprietary nursing
homes and nonprofit nursing homes.... This bill repeals the present exemption....
The Committee could find no acceptable reason why 1,427,012 employees of these
non-profit, non-public hospitals, representing 56% of all hospital employees, should
continue to be excluded from the coverage and protections of the Act.
S. REP. No. 93-766, at 1-3 (1974); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1051, at 4 (1974).
60. See Extension of NLRA to Nonprofit Hospital Employees: Hearings on H.R. 1236 Before the
Special Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong. 21-24 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R.
1236] (testimony of Charles E. Hargett, Representative, ANA).
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oped, nurses automatically would be classified as supervisors."1 By
law, patient care supervision is a primary duty of RNs.62 Moreover,
state nursing laws require RNs to exercise independentjudgment and
discretion in relation to patients' needs.6" The ANA argued that if
a broad reading of the Act's definition of supervisor were adopted, it
would defy Congress' expressed intention that RNs, as professionals,
be protected under the Act based on a factor (the use of independent
judgrent) that is necessary to qualify a RN as a professional in the
first instance.'
Separate bills were under consideration in the House and the
Senate. The committee reports for both bills addressed the ANA's
concerns and stated that no express amendment to section 2(11) was
needed given the NLRB's existing decisions.65 Both congressional
committees agreed with the Board's determination that when a health
care professional gives direction to other employees in the exercise of
professional judgment, incidental to the professional's treatment of
patients, it is not an exercise of supervisory authority in the interest
of the employer.66 The committees went on to state that they
intended that the Board continue to evaluate nursing cases in this
manner.
67
The committees' statements and Congress' failure to amend section
2 (11) take on exceptional importance because the Supreme Court has
61. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 492-93 (1993) (discussing concerns that arose
during congressional proceedings surrounding enactment of Health Care Amendments).
62. See Hearings on H.R. 1236, supra note 60, at 22-23; see also Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at
492 (discussing Health Care Amendments).
63. See Hearings on HR. 1236, supra note 60, at 22-23.
64. See id.
65. See S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974) (relating that express amendment was not needed
given Board's past decisions); H.R. REP. No. 93-1051, at 7 (1974) (stating that amendment to
supervisor definition was unnecessary given Board's prior precedent).
66. See S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 93-1051, at 7. The Senate Report stated:
Various organizations representing health care professionals have urged an amendment
to Section 2(11) of the Act so as to exclude such professionals from the definition of
'supervisor'. The Committee has studied this definition with particular reference to
health care professionals, such as registered nurses, interns, residents, fellows, and
salaried physicians and concludes that the proposed amendment is unnecessary
because of existing Board decisions. The Committee notes that the Board has carefully
avoided applying the definition of"supervisor" to a health care professional who gives
direction to other employees in the exercise of professional judgment, which direction
is incidental to the professional's treatment of patients, and thus is not the exercise of
supervisory authority in the interest of the employer.
The Committee expects the Board to continue evaluating the facts of each case in
this manner when making its determinations.
S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1051, at 7. The Supreme Court characterized
the above statement as an express approval by Congress of the Board's "incidental to patient
care" test. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 & n.30 (1980).
67. See S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1051, at 7.
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held that great weight is accorded to an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion, especially when Congress has reenacted the statute without any
pertinent change.' The Court has held that Congress' failure to
revise the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the
agency's construction is the one intended by Congress.6 9 Additional-
ly, subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute,
stated the Court, is entitled to significant weight."'
D. The Rise of the "Incidental to Patient Care" Test
Consistent with the congressional intent expressed in the committee
reports accompanying the Health Care Amendments,"' the Board
has utilized the "incidental to patient care" test to determine the
supervisory status of charge nurses in order to ensure that they are
not excluded from the Act's protections merely because of their
professional responsibility in assigning and directing aides.72 As the
68. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974) (discussing weight of agency
interpretation and effect of congressional re-enactment without change to agency interpreta-
tion); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (stating that courts should place
emphasis on fact that Congress has refused to alter administrative construction); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1965) (placing weight on fact that Congress re-enacted and amended statute
but left subject matter at issue untouched); Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682
(1965) (recognizing existence of statutory rule that "long-standing administrative interpretation,
applying to a substantially re-enacted statute, is deemed to have received congressional approval
and has the effect of law"); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361,365-66 (1951) (relating that
by re-enacting statute without pertinent modification, Congress accepted construction placed
thereon); Helvering v. RIJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114-15 (1939) (stating that
legislative approval of existing regulations as evidenced by re-enactment of statutory provision
without change gives regulations force of law); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 314-15 (1933) (finding that regulation developed before 1922 was continued and
confirmed with tacit approval of President and acquiescence of Congress).
69. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 275 (discussing weight of congressional failure to revise or
repeal agency interpretation); Zeme4 381 U.S. at 11-12 (postulating that congressional fhilure to
revise or repeal administrative interpretation constituted persuasive evidence that interpretation
reflected desired intent); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932) (stating that failure
of Congress to alter or amend statutory section related to agency regulations creates
presumption in favor of administrative interpretation).
70. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 275 (discussing weight given to subsequent legislation
declaring intent of earlier statute); Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 380-81 (stating that
subsequent legislation declaring intent of earlier statute is entitled to great weight); FHA v.
Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958) (positing that although not conclusive, subsequent
legislation declaring intent of earlier law is entitled to weight when it comes to problem of
construction).
71. See S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (stating that committee intended Board to continue to use
"incidental to patient care" analysis in determining nurses' supervisory status under Act); H.R.
REP. No. 93-1051, at 7 (same).
The Supreme Court characterized the committees' statements as an express approval by
Congress of the Board's "incidental to patient care" test. See Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 690 &
n.30 (noting Congress' approval of Board supervisory status test in health care context).
72. SeeWaverly-Cedar Falls Health Care, Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 390, 390, 393-94 (1989) (stating
that nurse's actions were not supervisory when exercised in interest of patient care), enforced, 933
F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1991); Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L1.UB. 442, 450 (1987) (stating that
mere fact that nurse was "in charge" of other employees does not establish that she exercised
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NRLB stated in Newton-Wellesley Hospital Ass'n,73 "the test for deter-
mining whether a health care professional is a supervisor is whether
that individual, who may give direction to other employees in the
exercise of professional judgment which is incidental to the
professional's treatment of patients, also exercises supervisory
authority in the interest of the employer."74 This test is not unique
to the health care field.75 It is similar to the Board's approach to
cases concerning architects, engineers, editors, and television
directors, in which it makes a distinction between functional and
operational duties.
76
any statutory indicia of supervisory status); Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr., 246 N.L.R.B. 351, 357
(1979) (holding that head nurse was not supervisor under Act when authority was exercised
primarily in providing patient care, not in supervising employees "in the interest of the
employer"), enfor-ed, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980); Eventide South, 239 N.L.R.B. 287, 289 (1978)
(concluding that charge nurses "perform[ed] their duties ... in the exercise of professional
judgment incidental to their treatment of patients" and that their authority was "directed toward
quality treatment of patients and [did] not, without more, constitute supervisory authority in the
Employer's interest"); Turtle Creek Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 235 N.L.1RB. 400,400 & n.3 (1978)
(concluding that RNs were not statutory supervisors); Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 226
N.L.R.B. 1036, 1037 (1976) (holding that head nurses perform their functions and duties almost
exclusively in exercise of professionaljudginent incidental to their treatment of patients); Sutter
Community Hosps., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 192 (1976) (determining that head and assistant head
nurses performed duties predominantly in exercise of professionaljudgment incidental to their
treatment of patients and not to general supervision of employees in subordinate positions, as
they possess none of traditional indicia of supervisory status); Valley Hosp., Ltd., 220 N.L.R.B.
1339, 1341 (1975) (finding that head nurses were not like administrative supervisors in that their
duties and functions embrace professional judgment incidental to patient treatment); Newton-
Wellesley Hosp. Ass'n, 219 N.L.RLB. 699, 699-700 (1975) (using "incidental to patient care" test
to find that nurse supervisors, nurse leaders, and assistant supervisors were statutory supervisors,
but that head nurses, assistant head nurses, and senior-staff nurses were not); Trustees of Noble
Hosp., 218 N.L.RtB. 1441, 1442-44 (1975) (finding that head nurses performed duties predomi-
nantly in exercise of professional judgment incidental to their treatment of patients and
concluding that nurses did not possess any traditional indicia of supervisory authority cognizable
under Act); Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 218 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1268-69 (1975) (concluding that team
leaders and charge nurses were not statutory supervisors because their duties were limited to
giving directions in performance of their professional duties); Wing Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 217
N.L.R1B. 1015, 1015-16 (1975) (holding that head nurses' duties and authority in assigning
employees and directing their work were principally product of highly professional skill and did
not, without more, constitute an exercise of supervisory authority "in the interest of the
employer").
73. 219 N.L.R.B. 699 (1975).
74. Id at 699-700 (using "incidental to patient care" test to find that nurse supervisors,
nurse leaders, and assistant supervisors were statutory supervisors, but that head nurses, assistant
head nurses, and senior staff nurses were not (citing Wing Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. at
1016))).
75. See Rabban, supra note 14, at 1802-04 (discussing cases in which Board applied similar
test and found variety of professionals outside health care field not to have supervisory status).
76. See id. (discussing distinctions between supervisory and professional duties). Professor
Rabban cites various cases in which the Board has differentiated between individuals who
exercise authority in connection with professional judgment and those who exercise authority
in connection with functional supervisory duties such as hiring, firing, promoting, and granting
leave. See id. at 1802-04 & nn.114, 117-18 (citing Washington Post Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 168, 205
(1981) (holding that editors who assign and edit stories are not supervisors because these actions
fall within scope of news writing profession); Ohio State Legal Servs. Ass'n, 239 N.L.IRB. 594,
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When examining the issue of supervisory status, the Board
determines if the individual or individuals in question possess any of
the twelve indicia of statutory authority." Next it looks to see if the
exercise of authority entails the use of independent judgment or is
merely routine." If independent judgment is used, the Board
inquires whether the individual exercised authority in the interest of
the employer.79
The NLRB maintains that the statutory term "in the interest of the
employer" denotes the employer's expectation of unqualified loyalty
from individuals in whom the employer has endowed certain
authorities to carry out management prerogatives."' When charge
nurses exercise responsibility in assigning and directing others to
provide sound patient care, they do so based on professional or
technical skill and status.8 This type of direction does not create
598 (1978) (refusing to rule that lawyers who served as unit heads were supervisors); Musical
Theatre Ass'n, 221 N.L.R.B. 872, 873 (1975) (finding that directors' and choreographers'
relationships with actors and dancers were artistic and professional, not supervisory);
Westinghouse Broad. Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 123, 125 (1974) (holding that television directors
motivated by artistic effect are not supervisors); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851,855-
59 (1974) (finding that project engineer's directions stemmed from professional expertise and
not from managerial authority); Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 522, 523-24 (1973)
(finding that editors who had final authority as to story's content acted in professional role and
not in statutory supervisory role); Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051
(1971) (finding that project architects who responsibly directed others in professional sense were
not within meaning of supervisor under Act); Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920,
921 (1971) (holding that when acting as project leader, architect gave directions to others only
to ensure quality of work on project and, in this capacity, was acting according to professional
norms, not supervisory status)).
77. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 491 (1993).
78. See id. at 492.
79. See id.; see also Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951-52 (1970) (drawing
distinction between nurses who exercise duties and authority as product of professional duties
and those vested with true supervisory authority); Sherewood Enters., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 354,355
(1969) (finding that instructing fellow, lesser-skilled hospital employees does not mean that RNs
act with supervisory authority "in the interest of their employer").
80. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.1RB. at 492; Newton-Wellesley Hosp. Ass'n, 219 N.L.R.B. 699,
699-700 (1975); see also Ohio Masonic Home, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 390, 395 (1989) (distinguishing
between work pursuant to independent professional judgment "incidental to patient care" and
work that involves personnel authority which more directly promotes the interest of the
employer and is not motivated by the patient's needs); Beverly Enters., 275 N.L.R.B. 943, 946-47
(1985) (distinguishing between exercise of independentjudgment "incidental to patient care"
and exercise of independent judgment allied with or directly promoting employer's interest,
motivated by such alliance with management and not greater skill or responsibility); Beverly
Enters., 264 N.L.R.B. 966, 967 (1982) (stating that exercise of authority in the interest of
employer, "as the term has been construed under the Act, is the employees' authority and
responsibility to enforce major personnel policies" which is distinguishable from assignment and
direction as outgrowth of employees professional or technical training and primarily "incidental
to patient care").
81. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R-B. at493; Sherewood Enters., 175 N.L.R-B. at 354 (finding that
RNs who teach fellow, lesser-skilled hospital employees do so because they are highly skilled
professionals, and not because they are supervisors acting "in the interest of their employer");
see also infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (describing LPNs' authority to give direction
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conflict between the interests of the employer and the interests of
other employees that would force an employer to demand the nurses'
undivided loyalty.8 2 Direction is given simply to provide quality and
efficient service. 3 An analogy can be drawn between charge nurses
and leadmen who assign and direct the work of less skilled helpers.84
The NLRB maintains thatjust because such assignment and direction
is in accord with the business goals of the company, it does not
negate the fact that such actions stem from the individual's profes-
sional or technical skill and status.85
E. Application of the "Incidental to Patient Care" Test to Licensed
Practical Nurses
The NLRB's "incidental to patient care" test developed from a line
of cases distinguishing protected professionals, such as RNs, from
supervisors.8 6 It was not always clear, therefore, that the test was
applicable to situations involving technicals, like LPNs."7 This issue
was addressed by the NLRB and the Sixth Circuit in the early 1980s.
In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
remanded an unfair labor practice case, Beverly Enterprises v. NLRB s
to the Board to determine the status of the LPNs at issue." The
Board was directed to ascertain whether the LPNs assigned and
directed employees as an exercise of independent professional
as stemming from their exercise of independent professional judgment).
82. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.LR.B. at 493; see also supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text
(discussing Packard decision and issue of divided loyalties).
83. See Bevery Enters., 313 N.L.P-B. at 494 & n.13.
84. See id. (discussing how tenets of distinction between strawbosses, leadmen, and other
minor supervisory employees and those individuals vested with "genuine management
prerogatives" have been incorporated into patient care setting); see also Higgins Indus., Inc., 150
N.L.R.B. 106, 111-12 (1964) (holding that job leaders who report, correct, warn, and assist
employees in addressing defective work were not statutory supervisors); Plastics Indus. Prods.,
Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1066, 1067-68 (1962) (finding that leadmen who assigned workers to
particular machines were not supervisors); Lindsay Newspapers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 680, 690-91
(1961) (finding that mailroom employee who could instruct other employees to assist workers
was not supervisor), enforced in relevant part, 315 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1963); Northern Chem.
Indus., 123 N.L.RB. 77, 78 (1959) (holding that leadman who delegates work to others was not
supervisor merely because he exercisedjudgment as more experienced mechanic); United States
Gypsum Co., 118 N.LR.B. 20, 29-30 (1957) (stating that maintenance leaders who prioritized
jobs and assigned work were not supervisors because such direction was merely function of
greater skill).
85. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 494.
86. See supra notes 49-85 and accompanying text (discussing formation of NLRB's
"incidental to patient care" standard as test to distinguish professionals from supervisors).
87. See supra notes 50, 52-53,56-85 and accompanying text (stating that NLRB test was not
always used in cases concerning LPNs due to their technical, non-professional status and that
"incidental to patient care" test was developed to distinguish professionals from supervisors, not
technicais from supervisors).
88. 661 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1981).
89. See Beverly Enters v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (6th Cir. 1981).
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judgment incidental to discharging their patient care responsibilities
or as an exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of their
employer."0 The court's holding reflected its apparent conclusion
that the "incidental to patient care" test was applicable to LPNs as well
as to RNs. 91
On remand, the Board applied the "incidental to patient care" test
and determined that the LPNs did assign and direct aides and
orderlies in the interest of the patient, not in the interest of the
employer.92 In a footnote, the Board observed that LPNs are
technicals and not professionals, but nonetheless concluded that the
"incidental to patient care" test was appropriate because both RNs
and LPNs "perform work requiring the use of independentjudgment
and specialized training."
93
Before Beverly Enterprises, the resolution of supervisory status cases
involving LPNs usually hinged on the presence or absence of the
exercise of independent judgment.94 Following the Sixth Circuit's
remand in Beverly Enterprses, the NLRB has supplanted the "absence
or presence of independent judgment" test with the "incidental to
patient care" test in LPN charge nurse cases with little thoughtftUl
discussion as to why a test used to distinguish between professional
authority and supervisory authority is appropriate to use with respect
to non-professionals.95 Although it appears entirely appropriate to
90. See ad. at 1104-05.
91. See id. at 1101-04 (discussing "incidental to patient care" test and concluding that
Regional Director did not analyze facts clearly or properly use supervisory status).
92. See Beverly Enters., 264 N.L.RIB. 966, 968 (1982).
93. Id. at 966 n.4.
94. Seesupra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing different rationales used in LPN
and RN supervisory status cases).
95. See Manor West, Inc., 313 N.LR.B. 956, 957-59 (1994) (applying "incidental to patient
care" test to LPN in statutory supervisory status determination); Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B.
491,504-05 (1993) (using "incidental to patient care" test to determine LPNs' supervisory status
and concluding that directions were given in interest of providing for patients' needs, not in
consideration of employer's best financial interest); Riverchase Health Care Ctr., 304 N.LR.B.
861, 863-64 (1991) (concluding that LPNs' assignment of work was both routine and primarily
concerned with patient care); Ohio Masonic Home, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 390, 39495 (1989)
(concluding that LPNs' direction of employees is motivated by patient care needs, not personnel
authority more directly promoting interest of employer); Phelps Community Med. Ctr., 295
N.L.R.B. 486,490 (1989) (finding that LPNs' day-to-day direction is primarily in connection with
patient care and not in interest of employer); Extendico-Prof'I Care, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 599, 599
(1984) (concluding that LPNs direct aides in routine nature emanating from LPNs high level
of training and experience in caring for patients, rather than from managerial judgment on
behalf of employer's best interests (citing NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1468 (7th Cir.
1983))); Colonial Manor 1977, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 525,527 (1983) (applying test but concluding
LPNs actually were supervisors); St. Mary's Home, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1039 (1981)
(applying "incidental to patient care" test to LPN and concluding that LPN's exercise of
judgment arises from training and experience inherent in position of LPN and related
exclusively to care of patients), enforced, 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
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apply this test to LPNs, the cases surprisingly are devoid of a thorough
discussion on this point.96
F Courts' Acceptance of the NLRB's 'Tncidental to Patient Care" Test
The Supreme Court97 and the Second,98 Seventh,99 Eighth,100
Ninth,' and Eleventh0 2 Circuit Courts of Appeals all have agreed
with the Board's "incidental to patient care" test. The Fourth Circuit
originally endorsed the Board's test but recently has wavered. 3
Only the Sixth Circuit has rejected the NLRB's "incidental to patient
care" test completely."°  It is indeed ironic that the Sixth Circuit,
largely responsible for expanding the "incidental to patient care" test
to encompass LPNs,0 5 would become its major nemesis.
96. See St. Mary's Home, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1039 (applying "incidental to patient care" test to
LPN and concluding LPN's exercise ofjudgment arises from training and experience inherent
in position of LPN and related exclusively to care of patients), enforced 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir.
1982).
In a 1993 decision, written in preparation for the Supreme Court's examination of the test,
the Board again chose to leave unresolved the issue of applying the "incidental to patient care"
test to LPNs. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 493 n.10 (providing cursory discussion of
application of test to LPNs).
97. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 & n.30 (1980) (approving Board's
"incidental to patient care" test and stating that Congress expressly approved the test in 1974
(citing S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974))).
98. See Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980), enforcing 246
N.L.R1B. 351 (1979).
99. See Children's Habilitation Ctr. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1989), enforcing 289
N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1988) (unreported); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983),
enforcing261 N.L.RB. 160 (1982); N.RB v. American Med. Servs., 705 F.2d 1472 (7th Cir. 1983),
denying enforcement to 258 N.L.R.B. 425 (1981), as supplemented by 262 N.L.R.B. 1458 (1982).
100. SeeWaverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1991), enforcing
298 N.L.R.B. 997 (1990).
101. See NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979), denying
enforcement to 232 N.L.R.B. 32 (1977); NLRB v. Doctors' Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 489 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1973).
102. See NLRB v. Walker County Med. Ctr., 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984), enforcing 260
N.L.R.B. 862 (1982).
103. SeeBeverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, Nos. 92-1068,92-1205, 1992 WL 223815, at "1-2 (4th Cir.
Sept. 11, 1992) (recognizing that other circuits have found LPNs not to be supervisors, but on
facts of instant case concluding that LPNs were supervisors), denying enforcement to No. 10-CA-
25599, 1991 WL 280339 (1991); NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1070 (4th Cir.
1982) (denying enforcement but recognizing applicability of Board's "incidental to patient care"
test), denying enforcement in relevant part to 258 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1981); Methodist Home v. NLRB,
596 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming Board's conclusion that charge nurses were
not supervisors).
104. See Health Care & Retirement Corp. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1260 (6th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Board's supervisory test for nurses is invalid), aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994); Beverly
Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1552-53 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no separate exception for
supervisors in health care field and concluding thatjust because direction was related to quality
of treatment of patients did not mean direction was not supervisory authority); NLRB v. Beacon
Light Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076, 1079-80 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that ALJ erred
in focusing on whether charge nurse was engaging in patient care).
105. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (discussing Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 661
F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1981), and expansion of "incidental to patient care" test). The Sixth Circuit
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In NLRB v. Yeshiva University,' the Supreme Court held that the
faculty members in question, although professionals protected under
section 2(12) of the Act,107 were in fact excludable due to their
managerial duties in determining all central policies of the university
including course selection, course offerings, teaching methods,
grading policies, and matriculation standards, and in effectively
deciding which students would be admitted, retained, and graduat-
ed."0 The Court rejected the Board's position that the faculty
members' decision-making authority was in the routine discharge
of professional duties."° The Court held that only when "an
employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely
performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned
with management." 0  The Court explicitly recognized that the
NLRB had properly distinguished between the routine discharge of
professional duties and the exercise of supervisory authority in other
settings."' The Court cited Board cases dealing with architects,
engineers, and health care providers, and expressly mentioned the
congressionally approved "incidental to patient care" test."'
The circuit courts of appeals that have approved the Board's use of
the "incidental to patient care" test have used a similar rationale."
3
They acknowledge that the test is an attempt to resolve the overlap-
ping directives of sections 2 (11) and 2 (12) of the Act that, respective-
ly, exclude supervisors and include professionals." 4 They also note
went to great lengths in Beverly Cal. to demonstrate that its holding in Beverly Enterprises was
consistent with its wholesale rejection of the "incidental to patient care" test. See 970 F.2d at
1553-55. When one reads the Beverly Enterprises case in its entirety and then reads the
fragmented quotes used in Beverly California to demonstrate its alleged consistency with Beverly
Enterprises, the Sixth Circuit's analysis appears disingenuous and fails to meet the proverbial
"laugh test." Compare Beverly Enter., 661 F.2d at 1102-05 (requiring Regional Director to apply
"incidental to patient care" test to LPNs), with Beverly Cal., 970 F.2d at 1553-54 (rejecting
"incidental to patient care" test in its entirety). For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's poor
attempts to find analytical consistency in Beverly Enterprises and Beverly California when none
possibly can exist, see infra notes 123-37.
106. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
107. See supra note 51 (discussing Act's applicability to professional employees).
108. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980).
109. See id.
110. Id. at 690.
111. See id. at 690 & nn.30-31.
112. See id. at 690 n.30.
113. See supra notes 98-102 (citing cases in which circuit courts of appeals have validated
"incidental to patient care" test).
114. See NLRB v. Children's Habilitation Ctr., Inc., 887 F.2d 130, 131 (7th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging that professionals may perform some supervision in accordance with
professional norms without being considered supervisors under Act); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.,
705 F.2d 1461,1465 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing basis for Board's distinction between supervision
in the statutory sense and work direction by professional); Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing Board's reason for not applying definition
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that the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress expressly
approved the test.115  The courts perceive that the goal of section
2(11) is to prevent dividing the loyalty of persons who, while
belonging to a union with the other employees, may have to fire,
discipline, or lay off those fellow employees."1 The exercise of
authority by professionals over others in accordance with professional
norms, not business norms or profit maximizing objectives, does not
raise an issue of divided loyalties."
7
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE "INCIDENTAL
TO PATIENT CARE" TEST
A. Pre-Health Care Cases
In 1987, the Sixth Circuit departed from its acceptance of the
Board's "incidental to patient care" test 18 when the court rejected
the test's application to a group of LPNs in NLRB v. Beacon Light
Christian Nursing Home. 9 In Beacon Light, the Board determined
that the LPNs were not supervisors in part because there was an
absence of responsible direction in the interest of the employer; only
responsible direction related to "mere patient care" was present. 2 '
The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement and held that patient care is
the business of a nursing home. 21 The court held that when nurses
otherwise meet the statutory definition of supervisor, their supervisory
of supervisor to health care professional whose direction of other employees is merely
"incidental" to patients' treatment).
115. See Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1465 (noting congressional approval of test).
116. See Children's Habilitation Ctr., 887 F.2d at 130, 131 (discussing problem of divided
loyalties); Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d at 1465-66 (discussing rationale behind § 2(11) of Act).
117. See Children's Habilitation Or., 887 F.2d at 134 (discussing why professional exercise of
authority in accordance with professional norms does not raise issue of divided loyalties); Res-
Care, 705 F.2d at 1466-68 (stating that although in gray area between supervisor and employee,
LPNs nonetheless are employees because employer would not leave employee hopelessly
overmatched or without loyal cadre of supervisors).
118. Seesupranotes 88-96andaccompanyingtext (discussingSixth Circuit's holding in Beverly
Enters.).
119. 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).
120. NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076, 1079 (6th Cir. 1987).
It is important to note that the Board acknowledged that, although solidly based, it has not
always been precise in applying the "incidental to patient care" test, sometimes using such
terminology as "mere patient care" or professionaljudgment "exercised routinely in furtherance
of patient care." Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.RB. at 494 n.12 (citing Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1079;
Riverchase Health Care Ctr., 304 N.L.R.B. 861 (1991)). As a result, these decisions do not
distinguish clearly the exercise of independent professional knowledge "incidental to patient
care" analysis from the separate and distinct analysis of whether the exercise of section 2(11)
authority is "merely routine or clerical in nature." Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 494; see also
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing distinct and separate analytical steps used
in determining statutory supervisory status).
121. See Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1079.
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role connected to patient care does not entitle them to protection
under the Act. 22
Subsequently, in 1992 the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed and strength-
ened its Beacon Light holding in Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB. 23
In Beverly California, the Board affirmed the Regional Director's
finding that a group of RNs were not statutory supervisors because
their duties were "generally limited to giving directions toward the
quality treatment of patients" and thus did not constitute supervisory
authority in the interest of the employer.12 ' Applying its Beacon
Light analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the RNs did indeed
fall within the statutory definition of supervisor." The court stated
that the "notion that direction given to subordinate personnel to
ensure that the employer's nursing home customers receive 'quality
care' somehow fails to qualify as direction given 'in the interest of the
employer' makes very little sense."'26  The court held that, as a
"matter of economics," it is self-evident that it is in the best interest
of an employer to do a superiorjob in serving the health care needs
of its customers. 27 The Sixth Circuit stated further that the use of
independentjudgment does not become "merely routine" when used
in the interest of patients, 28 apparently using the same incorrect
statement of the "incidental to patient care" test it faulted the NRLB
Regional Director for using in Beverly Enterprises;, the case that
extended the "incidental to patient care" test to LPNs. 29  Finally,
the Sixth Circuit attempted to demonstrate that its Beverly California
122. Seei.. The court concluded that neither the Taft-Hartley Act's text or legislative history
nor the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments of 1974 supported the Board's
position. See id.
123, 970 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1992).
124. See Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1549 (6th Cir. 1992).
125. See id.
126. Id- at 1552.
127. See id. at 1553.
128. See id.
129. See Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095,1101-05 (6th Cir. 1981) (discussing Regional
Director's confused application of "incidental to patient care" test). In Beverly Enterprises, the
Sixth Circuit took issue with the NLRB Regional Director's inclusion of LPNs in a bargaining
unit because the LPNs' duties were primarily those concerned with patient care and not a
product of independentjudgment. Seeid. at 1101. The Sixth Circuit, in correcting the Regional
Director, stated that "[t]he distinction must be made, not because professional care is a matter
of routine involving no independentjudgment, but because the independent judgment which
is necessarily involved in patient care, even if otherwise supervisory in character, is not always
strictly 'in the interest of the employer.'" Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "[e]ither the
LPNs are not supervisors because they do not exercise independent judgment in their
assignment and direction of the aides and orderlies, or they are not supervisors because they
exercise independent judgment professionally," but not "in the interest of the employer." Id.;
see also Beverly Enters., 313 N.LR.B. 491, 494 n.12 (1993) (discussing instances in which
"incidental to patient care" test was not clearly articulated when "mere patient care" terminology
was used in its decisions).
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holding was consistent with its decision in Beverly Enterprises."s° Even
a cursory review of these two cases, however, reveals that the court's
statements in Beverly California were disingenuous. 131  Given the
court's thorough explanation of the NLRB's supervisory test in Beverly
Enterprises, it is impossible to conclude that the court in Beverly
California believed that the two decisions were consistent.
B. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
The Sixth Circuit's attack on the Board's "incidental to patient
care" test continued with its decision in NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of America.132 At issue was the supervisory status of
several LPNs who allegedly were discharged for their "uncooperative
attitude."' 3 Coincidentally, the discharge occurred less than two
days after the LPNs had aired their grievances with the nursing
home's management to the company's Director of Human Resources
and Vice President of Operations."s The employer argued that the
discharges were not connected to the employees' meeting with
company officials.1
3 5
Writing for the majority in an openly hostile tone, Senior Circuit
Judge Celebrezze chastised the Board for failing to apply Sixth Circuit
case law, which holds that the Board's "incidental to patient care" test
cannot create an exception for supervisors in the health care field
that is unsupported by the Act's language or legislative history.3 6
Although the administrative law judge ("ALJ") and the NLRB did a
poor job of articulating the test used to determine supervisory status
in this instance, 3 7 the Sixth Circuit quickly recognized it as the
130. See Beverly Enters., 661 F.2d at 1101.
131. Compare id. (discussing proper test to be applied to LPNs and how it differs from
Regional Director's application), with Beverly CaL., 970 F.2d at 1553-55 (using selective quotes
from Beverly Enterprises to create impression that it is consistent with court's current analysis and
holding).
132. 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993), affdK, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
133. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 987 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (6th Cir.
1993), af'd, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
134. See id. at 1259.
135. See id.
136. See id at 1260-61 (stating reasons why Board's determination of supervisory status was
incorrect). The court was especially blunt with the NLRB. See id. (admonishing Board for
steadfastly refusing to follow Sixth Circuit law). The court revealed that it was "unfortunate" that
it had to "repeatedly remind the Board" that the court, not the NLRB, has the final
responsibility for interpreting the law and that only Congress can create exceptions to the Act's
definition of supervisor. See id.
137. See id. at 1259 (commenting that Board addressed issue only in footnote); see also Health
Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. 63, 63 & n.1 (1992) (rejecting employer's
argument that Beacon Light is controlling law on issue of test for determining supervisory status).
The ALJ did an even poorerjob of articulating the basis for his supervisory status determination.
See id. at 72 (containing ALJ's brief assessment of supervisory status).
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"incidental to patient care" test."s The Sixth Circuit again miscon-
strued the test as an exception for all nurses whose functions were
related to "mere patient care.""s Accordingly, citing its Beacon Light
and Beverly California decisions, the Sixth Circuit vacated the Board's
order.1 0
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN HEALTH CARE
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Health Care141 affirmed
the Sixth Circuit's decision and struck down the Board's "incidental
to patient care" test as inconsistent with both the NLRA's plain
meaning and Supreme Court precedent 42
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
While recognizing that the Board had developed the "incidental to
patient care" test to address the Act's inclusion of professional
employees, the Court held that the test was similar to the one it had
rejected in NLRB v. Yeshiva University"4 and therefore could "fare
no better."1 " The Court concluded that the Board's test created a
false dichotomy that was illogical because patient care is the business
of a nursing home." Attending the needs of patients, the
employer's customers, is absolutely in the employer's interest.'4
138. See Health Care 987 F.2d at 1260 (recognizing Board's position that "a nurse is not a
supervisor when her conduct is in the furtherance of the patient's interests").
139. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text (relating how Sixth Circuit apparently
chose to mischaracterize Board's test in Beverly Enterprises).
140. See Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1261.
141. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994). Justice
Kennedy delivered the majority opinion,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Scalia,
Thomas, and O'Connor. Justice Ginsburg presented a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun.
142. See id. at 1785. The Supreme Court acknowledged that there is a three part test for
determining whether an employee is a statutory supervisor. See id. at 1780. First, does the
employee have the authority to engage in one of the twelve listed activities? See id. Second,
does the exercise of such authority require independentjudgment, and is it of a merely routine
or clerical nature? See id. Third, does the employee hold the authority "in the interest of the
employer"? See id. The Supreme Court addressed the third question by discussing its
interpretation of the phrase "in the interest of the employer." See id.; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11) (1994) (providing statutory definition of supervisor).
143. 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding that faculty who had absolute control over academic
policies were managers because their duties fell outside scope of tasks routinely performed by
similarlysituated professionals); see supranotes 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing Yeshiva
Univ. decision).
144. Health Car4 114 S. Ct. at 1782. But see id. at 1792 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (stating that
majority's reliance on Yeshiva is puzzling because Court expressly approved of Board's test, and
that test is consistent with holding in that decision).
145. See id. at 1782. To try to separate acts taken in connection with patient care and acts
taken in connection with the interests of the employer, wrote Justice Kennedy, creates a false
dichotomy when patient care is the business service the employer is providing. See id.
146. See id.
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The definition of the phrase "in the interest of the employer," on
which the Court elaborated in Packard,47 still controls, stated the
Court, because Congress did not indicate that it changed the meaning
of the phrase when it modified the NLRA in 1974.148 The Packard
definition, not the Board's, wrote Justice Kennedy, is consistent with
the plain meaning of the Act.149 Although the Supreme Court
acknowledged that ambiguity may exist in other parts of the statutory
definition, such as in the phrases "independent judgment" and
"responsibly direct," it concluded that the meaning of the phrase "in
the interest of the employer" was clear.5 ' Additionally, the majority
147. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1945) (holding that § 2(2)
of the original act provides that every employee, by the very nature of employment in master's
business, is responsible for acting in master's interest). The Court, however, stated that the only
reason why this phrase was included in the definition was to make sure that courts apply the tort
principle of respondeat superior to employers' agents who commit unfair labor practices. See
id at 489; see also supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (discussing Packard decision).
148. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1782-83 (stating that when statute changes result reached
by judicial decision it does not automatically follow that statute changes meaning of language
interpreted in that decision (citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168
(1989))). Courts that have confronted the issue of the phrase's meaning, however, have
adopted the definition thatJustice Douglas set forth in his dissent in Packard, concluding that
the phrase certainly means more than what is contained in its literal meaning given Congress'
legislative reversal of Packard See id.; see also Food Store Employees Union Local 347 v. NLRB,
422 F.2d 685, 689-90 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing meaning of phrase "in the interest of the
employer" as used in NLRA definition of supervisor); NLRB v. Master Stevedores Ass'n, 418 F.2d
140, 142 (5th Cir. 1969) (relating that "entire work force from the president (of the company]
down to the messenger boy in one sense acts in the interest of the employer," and therefore that
some other test surely was contemplated); NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 148
(5th Cir. 1967) (stating that supervisory exclusion requires "real power" and "meaningful action"
with respect to statutory test, such that person in question is in effect part of management);
International Union of United Brewery Workers v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(stating that Congress contemplated something more than what is "afforded by sheerly literal
reading" of supervisory exclusion, that is, person in question must have "real power" such that
he is in effect a part of management); NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, Inc., 257
F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1958) (stating that when determining supervisory status ofworker, court
must look to see if worker shares power of management); NLRB v. Quincy Steel Casting Co.,
200 F.2d 293, 296 (1st Cir. 1952) (stating that court cannot rely on label given to employee, but
must look to see if person has exercised duties in such a way as to evidence sharing power of
management); NLRB v. Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F.2d 620, 625 (1st Cir. 1952) (stating that to
be statutory supervisor, worker must have genuine power to perform supervisory function and
be clothed with real power to discipline and direct responsibly).
These cases are consistent with Justice Ginsburg's comments in her dissenting opinion in
Health Care in which she questions the majority's reliance on the Packard decision in light of
Congress' legislative reversal of the case through the Taft-Hartley Amendment and concludes
that the proper focus should be on Justice Douglas' Packard dissent. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct.
at 1791 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text
(discussing Packard decision).
149. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1782-83.
150. See id. at 1783. But see id. at 1786-87 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (pointing out tensions
between § 2(11) and § 2(12) of Act that Board must resolve); supra note 51 and accompanying
text (discussing tensions and ambiguities created by Taft-Hartiey Amendments).
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felt that following the Board's test would render portions of the
statutory definition meaningless.
51
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's policy arguments because
they would create legal categories inconsistent with the meaning of
the Act. 152  The Court stated that "tensions" between sections 2(11)
and 2(12) of the NLRA could not be resolved by distorting statutory
language. 153  The Court dismissed the "test-affirming" statements
contained in the Health Care Amendments of 1974 committee
reports, characterizing them as "isolated statements" without "any
force of law."' 54 The Court also dismissed the vast number of Board
cases applying a similar supervisory status to fields outside the health
care industry, asserting that they were distinguishable because their
holdings did not rest on an interpretation of the phrase "in the
interest of the employer."155  Finally, the majority predicted that its
ruling would affect only the health care industry because, in the
Court'sjudgment, the Board had applied this unique definition of the
phrase "in the interest of the employer," only to the health care
industry.
15 6
151. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1783. But see itd. at 1792-98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(predicting that in time majority decision would renderAct's protection of professionals virtually
meaningless).
152. See id. at 1783-84. But see id, at 1786-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that tension
existed and that Board's resolution was rational and consistent).
153. See id. at 1784.
154. Id. The Court, however, failed to address its own contrary precedent that requires
courts to accord "great weight" to an agency's interpretation if Congress fails to modify such
interpretation when reenacting the Act and to subsequent congressional declarations of intent
of the earlier Act when passing amending legislation. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 274-75 (1974) (discussing instances in which agency interpretation is to be given "great
weight"); see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (same).
155. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785. But see id. at 1789 (GinsburgJ. dissenting) (listing
industries and citing cases in which Board applies similar test). Even a cursory review will
demonstrate that the majority's statement is unfounded. See, e.g., The Washington Post Co., 254
N.L.R.B. 168, 205 (1981) (holding that editors who assign and edit stories are not supervisors
because these actions fall within scope of news writing profession); Ohio State Legal Servs.
Ass'n., 239 N.L.RB. 594, 598 (1978) (holding that lawyers who serve as unit heads were not
supervisors); Musical Theatre Ass'n, 221 N.L.RB. 872, 873 (1975) (finding that directors' and
choreographers' relationships with actors and dancers were artistic and professional, not
supervisory); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 859 (1974) (finding that project
engineer's directions stemmed from professional expertise, not managerial authority); Wurster,
Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1974) (finding that project architects
responsibly directed others in professional sense, not within meaning of supervisor underAct);
Westinghouse Broad. Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 123, 125 (1974) (holding that television directors
motivated by artistic effect are not supervisors); Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc., 203 N.LR.B. 522,
524 (1973) (finding that editors with final authority as to story content were professionals and
not statutory supervisors); National Broad. Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1441-42 (1966) (stating that
editors who assign and edit stories are not supervisors because these actions falI within scope of
news writing profession).
156. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785. But see id. at 1791-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that reading given to this phrase by Court allows overly broad application). Justice
Ginsburg's prediction will ring true because the Board, despite the majority's assertion to the
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B. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg's dissent clearly articulated the tensions and
ambiguities inherent in the NLRA.'1 7  She explained that section
2(11), which excludes supervisors from the Act's protection, and
section 2(12), which includes professionals in the Act's protection,
overlap.' Both sections focus on individuals who exercise judg-
ment in assigning and directing others in some fashion.'59 Individu-
als who possess characteristics of both a supervisor and a professional
are excluded from the Act's protection."6 Therefore, a broader
statutory definition of supervisor will narrow the class of individuals
protected as professionals.1 6' The separation of excludable supervi-
sors from sheltered professionals, wrote Justice Ginsburg, is a task
Congress delegated to the NLRB and should not be disturbed if it is
rational and consistent with the Act.
62
Justice Ginsburg further stated that to harmonize the dueling
statutory sections, the Board properly focused on the policies that
motivated Congress to pass this legislation. 63 The test, she asserted,
properly distinguishes between professional authority and authority
encompassing "front-line" management prerogatives." The test
resembles tests the Board has used with respect to doctors, faculty
members, pharmacists, librarians, social workers, lawyers, television
contrary, does apply a substantially similar test in other industries. See supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
157. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785-93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Rabban, supra
note 14, at 1793-1800 (discussing ambiguities caused by Taft-HartleyAmendments); supra notes
35-36,51-52 and accompanying text (discussing § 2(11) and 2(12) and ambiguities and tensions
created).
158. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing similarities
between § 2(11) and 2(12)); supra notes 35-36,51-52 and accompanying text (discussing § 2(11)
and 2(12) and ambiguities and tensions created); see also Rabban, supra note 14, at 1793-1800
(discussing ambiguities caused by Taft-Hartley Amendments).
159. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (discussing how § 2(11) and
2(12) overlap due to use of similar language); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), (12) (1994)
(providing definitions of supervisor and professional); supranotes 35-36,51-52 and accompany-
ing text (discussing § 2(11) and 2(12) and ambiguities and tensions created).
160. SeeHealth Car, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (observing that § 2(11) and
2(12) overlap and that individuals who are in overlap zone are excludable).
161. See id. at 1786-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing effect of broad definition of
supervisor given that most professionals assign and direct others).
162. See i&L at 1786 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting); see also NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific,
Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990) ("This Court has emphasized often that the NLRB has the
primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy."); Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987) ('The Board, of course, is given considerable
authority to interpret the provisions of the NLRA.").
163. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing and citing
legislative history).
164. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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station directors, architects, and engineers." Justice Ginsburg
concluded that the Board's "incidental to patient care" test is both
rational and consistent with the Act and its persuasive legislative
history.166
In additionJustice Ginsburg found the majority's holding puzzling
for several reasons. First, the majority's definition of supervisor would
exclude most professionals from the Act's protection because it would
reach all professionals who use independent judgment to assign and
responsibly direct others, which most do. 6 7 This result would
contravene Congress' intent to limit the supervisor category.66
Second, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's reliance on
Packard was questionable because Congress legislatively reversed the
Supreme Court's holding in that case, and the definition of the
phrase was a primary part of the Court's analysis. 69 Most courts
that have confronted the issue utilized Justice Douglas' definition in
Packards dissenting opinion1'7 Third, the majority's attempt to use
Yeshiva University in support of its decision does not make sense'
7'
because one cannot credibly equate faculty members, who had
absolute power in all academic matters, to LPNs, whose power was
severely restricted.1 72  The majority's reliance on Yeshiva University
was especially troubling to Justice Ginsburg due to the fact that the
Court specifically endorsed the Board's "incidental to patient care"
test in that case. 73 Moreover, even if Yeshiva University could be
applied to the LPNs in Health Care, the Yeshiva University holding is
consistent, not inconsistent, with the Board's test. 74 In Yeshiva
University, the Court held that, when distinguishing between manageri-
al and professional status, the Board should determine whether the
165. See id. at 1789 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Rabban, supra note 14, at 183-84
(discussing similar rule used by NLRB in other industries and providing case law citations).
166. See Health Care 114 S. Ct. at 1786-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative
history and Board's successful effort in fulfilling statutory mandate).
167. See id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (noting that broad definition ofsupervisor will adversely
affect countless professionals, all of whom exercise independent judgment, and most of whom
assign and direct work of others).
168. See id. at 1791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority definition directly
contravenes expressed congressional intent).
169. See id. at 1792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing majority's misguided reliance on
majority opinion in Packard instead of on dissent).
170. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (listing cases in which courts have adhered
to Packard dissent in interpreting statutory phrase).
171. See Health Care 114 S. Ct. at 1792 (GinsburgJ., dissenting); see also supra notes 106-112
and accompanying text (discussing Court's decision in Yeshiva Univ.).
172. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1789 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (citing majority's endorsement of Board's test
in Yeshiva Univ. and applying Yeshiva Univ. holding to Health Care despite the fact that Yeshiva
Univ. concerned managerial status, not supervisory status under NLRA).
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person's duties fall outside the duties routinely performed by similarly
situated professionals. 7 By invalidating the Board's test in this
manner, the majority's opinion will have the effect of denying most
professionals the Act's protection.
1 76
C. Reaction to and Predicted Legal Effects of the Health Care Opinion
Reaction to the Health Care opinion has been markedly nega-
tive. 177 Most commentators agree that the Court misapplied or
175. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980).
176. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (predicting effect of
majority's ruling).
177. See AFL-CIO, Employers Spar over Reform ofLaborLaws Before Dunlop Commission, 1994 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at D-25 (Sept. 9, 1994) (relating opinion of Lewis Maltby, Director
of National Task Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace, who feels that NLRA should be
amended because "with the way that management is involving employees in day-to-day
operations, it won't be long before everyone is a supervisor under the NLRA, and no one has
even the theoretical right to join a union"); ANA Convention Calls for Legislation to Overturn
Supreme Court Decision, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 119, at D-23 (June 23,1994) (stating that
ANA seeks congressional action to overturn Health Care decision that acts as gag rule preventing
nurses from being advocates for their patients); ANA Delegates Call for Legislation to Overturn
Supreme Court Decision, 32 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont) No. 1571, at 809
(June 27, 1994) (relating ANA efforts to seek legislative reversal of Health Care case); Peter
Blackman, Challenge To Labor Employers Hope to Capitalize on High Court Ruling, N.Y. LJ., Aug.
18, 1994, at 5 (stating that Court's ruling potentially affects all professionals who assign work to
other employees and who use independentjudgment);Joseph R. Grodin, Report on the 1993-1994
Supreme Court Labor and Employment Law Term, 10 LAB. LAW. 693,697-99(1994) (commenting that
Court's holding exacerbates tension between statutory definitions of supervisor and professional
and arguably will have effects beyond health care industry); Christina M. Lyons, 1993-94 Annual
Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 36 B.C. L. REV. 307, 316 (1995) (concluding that Court's
interpretation is clearly contrary to congressional intent and will serve to limit greatly
professionals' inclusion under Act); Robin E. Margolis, Supreme Court Strikes Blow at Health Care
Unions, 11 HEAL.THsPAN 19, 19-20 (1994) (stating that Court's decision will have grave
consequences for health care unions and unions in other industries and predicting that many
nurses will now be beyond reach of union organizing campaigns); CharlesJ. Morris, A Blueprint
for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517,558-60 (1994) (stating that
Court's decision compounded problem of employee coverage under Act and should be
amended such that employee will not be supervisor unless supervisory functions consume
predominant part of employee's working time); William Priest, Collective Bargaining for Nurses
Under the National Labor Relations Ac4 16J. LEGAL MED. 277, 305-10 (1995) (concluding that
Court ignored legislative history and ambiguity in statute, and as a result nearly all professionals
may faIl within supervisor category); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L
REV. 139, 342, 350 (1994) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (concluding that Court improperly
imposed judicially preferred interpretation of Act by ignoring legislative history and engaging
in strained analysis of Yeshiva Univ. and Packard); Women Would Benefit from Lifting Supervisory
Exclusion, Panel Told, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 142, at D-8 (July 27, 1994) (discussing
ANA's belief that Court's decision will exclude from NLRA protection nurses who do not have
control over job and pay status resulting in chilling effect on unionization of nurses); Laura
Bailey, Note, Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America-"In the Interest of the Employer":
Broadening the Scope of the Supervisor Exclusion Under the NLRA, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 533, 545
(1995) (opining that Court misconstrued nature of supervisory function in health care field and
misapplied policies that motivated Congress, thereby eliminating protections of Act for many
workers); ChristopherJ. Lawhorn, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.: One Leis
Hurdle to Finding 'Supervisor" Status, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 619, 666-67 (1995) (positing that
majority's over-formalistic interpretation of phrase "in the interest of the employer" thwarts
objectives of Congress, and as a result many workers who are not truly supervisors will lose their
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ignored the policies motivating Congress to enact the provisions and
effectively eliminated the protections of the NLRA for many people
both inside and outside the health care industry." A thorough
review of the Board's status determination cases concerning profes-
sionals in other industries reveals that the majority's assertions were
incorrect. Because the Board's analysis in such cases is extremely
similar to that applied in cases concerning the supervisory status of
health care professionals, professionals in those industries are in
danger of losing their protection under the Act as well." 9
The Supreme Court, by invalidating the Board's twenty-year-old
"incidental to patient care" test despite the test's solid basis in the
NLRA's legislative history and notwithstanding the great deference
due the NLRB's interpretation of the Act, has dealt a serious blow to
thousands of professionals in America's work force. The questions
that remain are how, why, and at what cost will Health Care affect the
federal administrative system? Is it true, as one commentator has
predicted, that the only impact that the Health Care decision will have
is that the Board will be required merely to change its "phraseology"
in deciding such cases, or is there a more damaging result?' 80
rights under Act); Kristin Hay O'Neal, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America: Possible Implications for Supervisory Status Analysis of Professionals Under the National Labor
Relations Ac4 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 841, 855-62 (1995) (stating that decision adversely affects
professionals and that congressional intervention is required to preserve inclusion of
professionals underAct); FrederickJ. Woodson, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.
ofAmerica: Signaling the Need for Reision oftheNLRA, 14J.L. & COM. 301,308-13 (1995) (stating
that because Board's interpretation can be readily applied to other industries, the "parade of
horribles" decision on employees in other industries is not misplaced and will affect adversely
cooperative work efforts and employee involvement programs); Stuart Silverstein, Court Ruling
Seen as Setback for Unions in Nursing Feld Labor- The Legal Definition of a Supervisor Could Thin
Ranks of Locals and Affect Outcomes of Some Organizing Elections, LA. TiMES, May 25, 1994, at D1
(suggesting that Court's decision could chill union organizing and cooperative labor-
management programs in other industries); Washington State Nurses Association Disturbed by
Supreme Court Decision on Nurses as Supervisors, PR Newswire, May 26, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (stating that Washington State Nurses Association feels Court was
clearly wrong to label nurses as supervisors when acting as professional employees and comes
at time when cost cutting is jeopardizing quality of service and safety of patient care).
178. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (providing articles that explain detrimental
implications of Health Care decision).
179. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
180. SeeLABORLAwDEVELOPMENTS § 1.02[2] (CarolJ. Holgren &AnitaM. Stovereds., 1995)
(stating that Board may circumvent Health Care by changing wording of test).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. Chevron Deference
Amazingly enough, neither the majority nor the dissent in Health
Care quoted Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
ciW "l the landmark case in which the Supreme Court resolved a
longstanding and highly contentious dispute concerning judicial
deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. 82 In fact, one commentator accused the Supreme Court of
purposely avoiding a discussion of Chevron deference in Health Care so
that it improperly could impose a judicially preferred interpretation
of the NLRA on the Board.
1 83
Prior to Chevron, the tension between the judiciary's law-declaring
role, which includes ensuring that agencies stay within their statutory
boundaries," and the need to defer to broad congressional delega-
tions of power to government agencies, the hallmark of our modern
administrative state," resulted in erratic application of the defer-
ence doctrine in the federal courts. 8 To remedy this, the Court
in Chevron decreed that a two-part test should be used by courts when
reviewing agency constructions of a statute. 87 First, the reviewing
court must determine "whether Congress has directly spoken on the
181. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
182. See generally Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations
that Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 957 (1994) (discussing
importance and effect of Chevron decision).
183. See Leading Cases, supra note 177, at 342.
184. See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283, 283
(1986) (discussing soundness of policy ofjudicial restraint in interpretation ofstatutes with aim
of promoting and preserving federalism). As Starr notes, agency deference seems facially
contrary to the holding in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), because it is
"emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. Deference to
agency rulemaking, therefore, usurps the role of the courts in an area that is guarded jealously.
See id.
185. SeeAntonin ScaliaJudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE LJ.
511, 516-17 (discussing Chevron and concluding that deference of courts to legislative intent is
proper when Congress intended to leave interpretation of statute to legislative agency).
186. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 749 (1995) (stating
that prior to Chevron, courts rarely explained why they sometimes would give deference to
agency construction and other times would substitute their own construction for that of the
agency); Starr, supra note 184, at 283 (citing reasons for erratic application of deference
doctrine in federal courts).
187. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that judicial review of agency's statutory interpretation must ask whether
Congress has addressed issue directly and, if not, must determine whether agency's interpreta-
tion is based on "a permissible construction of the statute") (footnote omitted).
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precise question at issue."1" If the intent of Congress is clear, the
inquiry ends, for the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress
must be given effect. 89 If, however, the court concludes that
Congress has not spoken directly on the issue and if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the second
question for the court is whether the agency's interpretation is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.1"°
The Chevron deference test provides for enhanced political
accountability for policy decisions.19" ' It evidences the Court's
recognition that the resolution of statutory ambiguities often requires
policy choices that are better left to administrative agencies.' 9 The
Chevron test also cured a split between circuits as to the proper
standard for judicial review of agency interpretations.'93 Its analysis
replaces a myriad of distinctly different tests.9 4
Chevron deference, by its own definition, is based on determining
and effectuating congressional "intent."' 95 The process used to
188. 1& In a footnote, the Court stated that courts are to employ "traditional tools of
statutory construction" to ascertain if Congress "had an intention on the precise question at
issue." Id. at 843 n.9. Unfortunately, the court's failure to state what exactly are the "traditional
tools of statutory construction" has provided textualists with the opportunity to obliterate the
Chevron doctrine. SeePierce, supra note 186, at 750 (attributing inconsistency in applying Chevron
test to footnote nine).
189. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
190. See id. at 843. Later in its decision, the Court made clear that a "permissible
construction" simply means a reasonable one. See id. at 844; Starr, supra note 184, at 288.
191. See Pierce, supra note 186, at 749-50 (stating that Chevron test would enhance political
accountability because decisions would be made by agencies rather than by insulated judges).
192. See Starr, supra note 184, at 292-93 (discussing legal effects of Chevron decision).
193. See, ag., Children's Habilitation Ctr., Inc., v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130, 132 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that court must review Board's determinations with "a lightish hand," and simulta-
neously noting "the Board's well-attested manipulativeness in the interpretation of the statutory
test for 'supervisor'"); NLRB v. Res-care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983) (claiming that
Board's determination is factual rather than legal and thus should get "deferential" treatment,
and also charging that Board's ad hoc policy determinations leave it open to attacks of
"opportunism"); NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating
that rule is to uphold Board's interpretation of supervisory status if supported by "substantial
evidence on the record as a whole" but acknowledging Board's inconsistency and concluding
that "courts must carefully scrutinize" Board's determinations); Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying "substantial evidence on the record" test);
NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 422 (9th Cir. 1979) (deferring to Board's
finding of fact although acknowledging that outcome would have been different if decided de
novo); Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (4th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that
Board's decision should be overturned only when it is "without support in the record or contrary
to law").
194. See Starr, supra note 184, at 292-93 (asserting that Chevron "cast substantial doubt upon
several well-established doctrines").
195. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 & nn.9-11 (establishing two-part test). The first part of
the test requires that if the "intent of Congress is clear," it must be given effect. Id. at 842-43.
The intent is ascertained by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction." Id at 843
n.9. The decision states thatifan agency's interpretation "'represents a reasonable accommoda-
tion of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should
not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation
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discover "intent" is referred to as "intentionalism."9 6  It consists of
searching for legislative purpose through legislative history, which
consists of floor debates, committee reports, hearing testimony, and
presidential messages, 197 so that courts can implement the original
intent of the enacting Congress.198 In the United States, the
practice of reviewing extra-textual sources to ascertain an act's
meaning dates back at least one hundred years."9
B. Textualism
The Health Care decision was devoid of any discussion of the Chevron
mandate because Justice Kennedy employed a method of statutory
interpretation called "textualism," which seeks objectivity in interpret-
ing statutes by focusing not on the legislature's intent, but rather on
what an ordinary reader would have understood the words to mean
at the time of the law's enactment.2° Justices Scalia and Kennedy
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.'" Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
196. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrin 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351,357 (1994) (stating that Chevron opinion "speaks the language of legislative intent and
was authored by Justice Stevens, the last true-blue holdout in favor of intentionalism and
legislative history in statutory interpretation").
197. See Pierce, supra note 186, at 750 & n.10 (discussing intentionalism and its tools).
198. SeeWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualisr, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626-27 (1990).
199. See id.; Wald, supra note 5, at 280 (tracing use of legislative history (citing Patricia M.
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REv. 195, 196-97 (1983))).
In the vast majority of cases during the Warren and Burger Courts, the Court consulted an
act's legislative history to reassure itself that its interpretation of clear text was not inconsistent
with the legislature's intent. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 627. Additionally, when a
subsequent Congress relies on particular assumed interpretations that clearly are not incorrect,
intentionalists believe that it makes good sense to credit these interpretations. See id. at 635-36
(stating that Supreme Court has given weight to subsequent legislative history).
200. See Leading Cases, supra note 177, at 349-50 (discussing interpretive methodology of
textualism and its effect on Chevron deference in Health Core); Merrill, supra note 196, at 351
(stating that textualism virtually banishes all consideration oflegislative history). During the past
several years, textualism has gained the attention of academics. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON,
JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 77-80 (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 113-22 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.J.L & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 198;
JohnJ. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and Legitimacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1991); Steven R.
Greenberger, Civil Rghts and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 37 (1991);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction,
17 HARv.J.L & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994);Jerry L. Marshaw, Textualim, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991); William T. Mayton, Law
Among the Pleonasms: TheFutility and Aconstitutionality of LegislativeHistory in Statutory Interpretation,
41 EMORY LJ. 113 (1992); Pierce, supra note 186; William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of
Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L REv. 1133 (1992); Kenneth W. Starr,
Observations About the Use of Legislative Histoy, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371; George H. Taylor, Structural
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995); Wald, supra note 5; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597 (1991).
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champion this form of statutory analysis."0 1 Textualists generally
repudiate approaches to statutory interpretation that employ
legislative history to determine statutory intent,202 believing that
legislators and staff manipulate legislative historyw 0 3 and that judges
selectively focus on portions of legislative history to advance their own
policy preferences.2" Textualists argue that such an approach
violates the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.0 5
To elaborate on the proper way to view the relationship among
author, text, and interpreter, textualists focus on an act's internal
linguistic structure and, when necessary, the impinging external
background assumptions, including those cultural, political, and
ideological in nature, surrounding an act's meaning.0 6 Textualists
focus on the text, rather than on the author's intentions, because the
process of trying to leap into the author's mind is viewed as a futile
task, amounting to nothing more than "wild guesses" 20 7 and, as
such, constitutes an impermissible exercise in judicial creativity.
203
201. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 640 (stating thatJustice Scalia is major proponent of
textualism); Wald, supra note 5, at 281 (stating thatJustices Scalia and Kennedy are textualists'
"spiritual leaders").
202. See Karkkainen, supra note 200, at 414-22 (relating Justice Scalia's criticisms of
intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation); Taylor, supra note 200, at 322-23 (stating
textualists' objections to use of legislative history as reliable indicator of congressional intent);
Wald, supra note 5, at 285 (discussing textualists' attack on extra-statutory materials).
203. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 643-45, 650-56 (stating that specific explanation in
committee reports may be more strategic than sincere expressions ofstatute's meaning); see also
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 423
(1988) (stating that U.S. legal system: (1) allows congressional staff members to concoct
rationales about laws and place them in committee reports to deceive courts; (2) tolerates
legislators who contrive to smuggle their own interpretations of laws into later committee reports
concerning other matters; and (3) endures courts that foolishly give credence to such deceptive
evidence).
204. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 660 (relating that Justice Kennedy believes that
rummaging" through unauthoritative materials to consult spirit of legislation in order to
discover alternative interpretation of act that makes the Court more comfortable does not foster
"democratic exegesis"); Karkkainen, supra note 200, at 415-22 (discussingJustice Scalia's view of
intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation); Taylor, supra note 200, at 322-23 (criticizing
judicial use of legislative history to advance its own interpretations); Wald, supra note 5, at 285
(discussing textualists' attack on use of all extra-statutory materials).
205. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 650, 671 (stating that Justice Scalia objects to use of
legislative history on separation of powers grounds including theories of bicameralism and
presentment); Taylor, supra note 200, at 323 (discussing grounds on which textualists reject use
of legislative history).
In Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,191-92 (1988) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment),
Justice Scalia commented that "[c]ommittee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies
between Congressmen, are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its
presentment to the President."
206. See Taylor, supra note 200, at 324-25 (discussing textualists' evaluation of text's
meaning).
207. See Eskridge supra note 198, at 643 (relating that Judge Easterbrook has stated that
reliance on legislative history to discern intent amounts to "wild guesses").
208. See Taylor, supra note 200, at 327, 367 (discussing impermissibility of interpretist/
intentionalist approach).
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Meaning, textualists contend, is not a matter of private language or
subjective mental intentions, but is necessarily a public and social
occurrence." 9 Judge Easterbrook expressed the concept of textu-
alism best when he stated that the proper statutory inquiry "is not
what the drafters thought their rule would accomplish .... but what
their rule is."21 Textualists believe that the text achieves meaning
distinguishable from what the author may have intended.21' The
public and social process of "inscripting meaning" in language
disconnects the written work from the author's subjective intention.
Consequently, a written work has an autonomous space of meaning
apart from the author's intended meaning. 12 The interpretation
of meaning, textualists assert, must come from such public and social
inscriptions of meaning, not from the incommunicable subjective
intent or "psychic experience" of the author.213
Moreover, textualists argue that meaning must be derived from the
words themselves because it is impossible to talk of a single intent of
a multi-member legislative body. There can be hundreds of intents,
or there may be none, as in those instances in which the issue never
was contemplated by legislators.214 Textualists reject the notion that
it is permissible to use legislative history to construct artificially a
"median legislator" by which to gauge intent.1 "A statute is a
public act whose meaning is not necessarily the same as the sum of
the private intentions of those who voted in its favor.121 6 All that
can be safely relied on when interpreting a statute, textualists
conclude, is the statutory language that was approved by both
chambers of Congress and signed by the President.217
For textualists, finding the meaning of any problematic statutory
term should be approached as a holistic endeavor focusing on the
209. See id. at 327-28 (discussing insights of textualism).
210. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE 349, 359 (1987).
211. See Taylor, supra note 200, at 334-36 (discussing the "intentional fallacy" of confusing
.a work with its origins").
212. See id. at 337 (discussing insights of textualism).
213. See id. at 336-38 (discussing text's separate existence from author's intent).
214. See id. at 339. Additionally, a legislature may vote for a bill purely for the purpose of
securing support of party leadership for some other initiative. When this is the case, there is
motive, but no intent. See id. at 339 & n.80 (discussing presence and absence of legislator's
motive and intent).
215. See id. at 340 & n.81 (citing Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows
at Democracy: Social Choice Thermy, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,
2211 n.243 (1990)).
216. Id. at 340-41.
217. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 654 (relating that when looking for meaning one can
safely rely solely on language); Wald, supra note 5, at 282 (stating that textualists believe
statutory language is only definitive source of congressional intent).
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structural and linguistic context of the entire statute and other related
statutes. 2 8 Textualists consider the formal relationships between
parts of a statute, such as syntax, grammar, and design of the statute
as a whole.2 19  The meaning of a word or phrase is qualified both
by the sentence in which it appears and by the nature of the entire
document.22° The textualist looks to see if one meaning of a word
would render other provisions duplicative or superfluous, or if one
meaning comports with a pattern of assumptions supported by the
statute's structure.22'
Textualists, however, do concede that words are not self-defining,
natural or original, but acquire meaning from their background
principles, perspectives, and relevant culture.222 One understands
what another says notjust because of the literal meaning of the words,
but also because of an understanding of the contextual relationship
underlying those words.2  Most of the time, a shared command of
language allows one to recognize another's meaning without resorting
to interpretation. 224  Difficulty develops when two or more sets of
background assumptions conflict.21 Textualists have yet to resolve
this issue.226 Some have suggested that legislative history could be
re-incorporated into the statutory interpretation process to provide
guidance as to the meaning of the language.227 The inquiry would
be to determine what competent individuals of the time understood
the words to mean, not what the legislators intended.228
Critics of textualism assert that to reject completely all legislative
history and to rely on the text alone, as some textualist proponents
218. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 655-56, 666-69 (discussing how meaning is to be
determined under textualist approach); Taylor, supra note 200, at 341-54 (relating methods of
textual analysis); Wald, supra note 5, at 282 (stating that textualists find meaning of particular
words within four comers of statute itself).
219. See Taylor, supra note 200, at 342-43 (relating methods of textual analysis); Wald, supra
note 5, at 282 (stating that textualists consider statutory language as exclusive source of
congressional intent).
220. See Taylor, supra note 200, at 341-54; Wald, supra note 5, at 282.
221. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 667.
222. SeeTaylor, supra note 200, at 363-64 (stating that external context of words is factor that
must be acknowledged and somehow integrated into textualist approach).
223. See id. at 365 (discussing background assumptions inherent in meaning of words).
224. See id. at 371-73 (stating that shared customs, institutions, and practices often prepare
us to know each other's meaning without resorting to interpretation).
225. See iU/ at 373-82 (stating that when there is conflict between common background
assumptions, external reference sources are needed to resolve issue).
226. See id. at 377 (stating that textualists do not pay enough attention to external contexts).
227. See id. at 378-82.
228. See id at 378-82 (suggesting that legislative history could assist in statutory interpretation
by identifying proper background assumptions and meanings of certain words).
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desire,229 leads to the same inaccuracies that textualists argue plague
intentionalism. 2' Reliance solely on the text can lead to a "hyper-
literal reading and blindersjurisprudence." 3 '
Furthermore, critics argue that a majority of the Supreme Court has
adopted textualism to promote a "hidden agenda." By deferring only
to Republican-controlled agencies and narrowly construing liberal
laws, textualists endeavor to reduce the power of the federal govern-
ment.23 2  Critics also contend that external context has not been
integrated adequately into the textualist approach.233 Other critics
argue that textualism is subject to the same objections it levels against
intentionalism-specifically, that textualist interpretation is not
supported by rigorous constitutional requirements. 2' These critics
maintain that "result-oriented" jurists will not be constrained under
either intentionalism or textualism.235
Given, however, that the Constitution contemplates deliberate study
and debate in both chambers, to the extent that legislative history
reflects this discourse, the "constitutional procedures of legislation"
seem to tolerate some use of legislative history.2 6 Judge Patricia
Wald asserts that legislative history is an authoritative product of the
institutional work of Congress and represents the way Congress has
chosen to communicate with the outside world.3 7 To second guess
Congress' chosen form of organization and delegation or to cast
doubt on Congress' ability to oversee its own constitutional functions
responsibly, Judge Wald contends, approaches violating the separation
of powers doctrine.2a
229. SeeEskridge, supra note 198, at 623 (stating thatJustice Scalia practices "new textualism,"
which rejects consideration of legislative history once Court ascertains plain meaning of statute);
Pierce, supra note 186, at 752 (characterizing "hypertextualism" as textualist approach that
ignores evidence that suggests Congress' intended result is inconsistent with Court's
construction).
230. See Taylor, supra note 200, at 378-82 (suggesting that interpreting meaning of text
through legislative history does not contradict basic themes of textualism).
231. Pierce, supra note 186, at 752; cf Taylor, supra note 200, at 381 (suggesting that
exclusion of legislative history altogether is unwise); Wald, supra note 5, at 303 (arguing that
alternative sources used by textualists are not necessarily better than legislative history).
232. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 668-69 (relating critics' objections to textualist
approach).
233. See id. at 669 (relating critics' objections to textualist approach); Wald, supra note 5, at
302 (stating that textualists do the public a disservice by suggesting that statutory construction
can be performed successfully without using external sources for context).
234. See Eskridge, supra note 198, at 668-71.
235. See id. at 675.
236. See id. at 673; see also Wald, supra note 5, at 306-07 (stating that "legislative history is the
authoritative product... of the Congress" and should be utilized).
237. See Wald, supra note 5, at 308-09.
238. See ia. (arguing that although textualists cite separation of powers doctrine as reason




C. The Effect of Textualism on Chevron Deference
Very little legal scholarship has focused on the relationship between
textualism and Chevron deference.3 9 Professor Thomas Merrill of
Northwestern University sought to address this void with a thorough
examination of recent Supreme Court cases.2" His findings should
be of great concern to proponents of Chevron deference. Textualism,
argues Professor Merrill, is a threat to the future of the doctrine of
deference.24' Professor Merrill notes that, at a minimum, adherence
to textualism requires a reformulation of the Chevron two-step
deference test to purge its intentionalist language.242  A more
fundamental consequence of textualism is the Court's rejection of the
notion that its proper role is to be a faithful agent of the legislature
and agencies. Instead, the Court is beginning to act as an autono-
mous interpreter seeking to find statutory meaning through the
"ordinary reader perspective."2 4s
Whereas during its 1981 Term the Court substantially used
legislative history in all of its statutory construction cases, in its 1988
Term, the Court substantially used legislative history in only seventy-
five percent of such cases. 4  Indeed ten of the Court's 1988
statutory interpretation decisions made no reference to legislative
history whatsoever .2 1 In 1992, of the sixty-six statutory interpreta-
tion cases, forty made no reference to legislative history.246 As this
data demonstrates, in less than a decade, the Court has relegated the
use of legislative history to a small minority of opinions. 47
239. See Merrill, supra note 196, at 352-53 (stating that there has been little consideration of
the relationship between these two foundationalist approaches). Commentators have focused
attention, however, on the haphazard judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra
note 198, at 656-60 (discussing effects of "new textualism" on Supreme Court's approach to
statutory interpretation); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984, 1022 (revealing that federal
courts upheld only 43.9% of agency rules).
240. See Merrill, supra note 196, at 355-63 (examining Supreme Court cases addressing
interplay between Chevron deference and textualism).
241. See id. at 354.
242. See id. at 358-63.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 355-57 (discussing decline in Supreme Court's use of legislative history from
1981 to 1992 and corresponding rise of textualism as method of statutory interpretation); Wald,
supra note 5, at 287-88, 298; Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative Histoy in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 215-16 (1983).
245. See Merrill, supra note 196, at 355-57.
246. See id. (discussing data gathered and analyzed pertaining to statutory cases in Court's
1992 Term).
247. See id. at 356-57.
1996]
THE AMERICAN UNERSnIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:575
This abandonment of legislative history is related to the steady rise
of textualism. In fact, there are cases in which the Court has
reformulated the Chevron test into a textualist-driven inquiry. In
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 248 for
example, the Court restates Chevron as follows:
If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain
language of the statute, deference is due. In ascertaining whether
the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the
language, a court must look to the structure and language of the
statute as a whole. If the text is ambiguous and so open to
interpretation in some respects, a degree of deference is granted to
the agency, though a reviewing court need not accept an interpreta-
tion which is unreasonable.
249
This textualist reformulation adversely affects the frequency with
which the Court defers to agency construction.2 ° The Court's 1992
Term reflects a dramatic reduction in the adherence to the deference
doctrine.251 The marginalization of the deference doctrine can be
viewed as the progression of the trend that emerged in 1989-90;
although the number of cases applying Chevron actually increased
during that period, most were resolved at the first prong of the test,
thereby not requiring deference to be accorded to the agency.
252
The symbolic difference between resolving statutory cases at the first
step of the Chevron test on the one hand, and not mentioning the
Chevron test at all on the other, is that in the first instance, by
referring to Chevron, the Court acknowledges that deference to
agencies is a major factor in the analysis.53
Professor Merrill doubts that the rise of textualism is due to a
general conversion by the Justices to textualist tenets. 54 Rather,
Professor Merrill posits thatJustice Scalia's refusal to join any part of
an opinion that utilizes legislative history forces otherJustices to write
opinions without any reference to legislative history in their analysis
in order to gain Justice Scalia's vote.255 Moreover, intentionalist
Justices have not stood equally firm in refusing tojoin an opinion that
248. 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
249. National R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1992).
250. See Merrill, supra note 196, at 358-63 (discussing textualism's negative impact on
deference doctrine).
251. See id. at 362 (noting that only two decisions in 1992 Term "turned in any significant
degree on the deference doctrine").
252. See id. (discussing marginalization of deference doctrine as stemming from clear trend
away from according deference to agencies).
253. See id. (discussing symbolic difference between mentioning Chevron and avoiding it
entirely).
254. See id. at 363-65 (discussing reasons for textualism's quick rise).
255. See id. at 365 (discussing effects of consensus building on rise of textualism).
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fails to consider legislative history.16  The need for consensus
building discourages the use of legislative history, and therefore,
deference; if one ignores Chevron, one only can gain votes, not lose
them.257  Further, each of the two camps, textualists and inten-
tionalists, argue that the other's approach opens the field of possible
interpretations instead of narrowing the range of alternative mean-
ings,251 Until the debate is settled, both sides will avoid deferring
to agency interpretations so as not to weaken their positions.259
Furthermore, Professor Merrill opines that textualism approaches
the issue of statutory construction as a puzzle with only one correct
answer.21 This active and creative approach to statutory construc-
tion is "subtly incompatible with the attitude of deference to other
institutions," namely Congress and administrative agencies.261 The
textualist approach tacitly rejects its role as a "faithful agent" of
congressional intent and reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes and adopts an autonomous interpreter role.262
Textualists lose sight of deference because they are consumed with
finding imaginative and creative ways of applying the few tools of
statutory construction to which they have limited themselves in their
quest to discern the statute's plain meaning.263 By its very nature,
textualism inhibits several generally desirable results of deference,
including: (1) ensuring that policy is made by politically accountable
actors; (2) ensuring that policy is made by individuals who have
specialized knowledge; (3) providing flexibility in statutory interpreta-
tion; and (4) assuring a nationally uniform approach to statutory
constructions.2 4
1. The Health Care decision as an example of the impact of textualism
Even though the Supreme Court overruled the Board's interpreta-
tion of the NLRA in Health Care, the Court avoided any discussion of
Chevron deference by concluding that the statutory language had a
clear meaning that foreclosed all other possible interpretations.2
256. See id.
257. See id. (discussing results of consensus building).
258. See id. at 366-71 (discussing reasons why neither side will defer to agency until dispute
as to valid way of interpreting statutes is resolved).
259. See id.





265. See Leading Cases, supra note 177, at 347 (analyzing how Court arrived at its decision in
Health Care).
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In effect, the Court imposed a judicially preferred interpretation of
the NLRA2 by circumventing the Chevron mandate of deference to
the NLRB's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
phrase.
267
As Professor Merrill predicted, Justice Kennedy distorted the first
prong of Chevron by not asking "whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue,"21 but instead whether the text had
an ordinary meaning.269  Justice Kennedy found this "ordinary
meaning" only after severely straining the holdings in Yeshiva
University and Packard.27°  Having found an "ordinary meaning,"
Justice Kennedy did not have to proceed to Chevron's second
prong.
27 1
In apparent agreement with Professor Merill, Judge Wald recently
commented that the NLRA's language was susceptible to either the
majority's or dissent's (hence the NLRB's) construction, but that it
"was the Court's own rhetorical description of its test that would
become the determinative factor in future cases."272  Health Care,
therefore, represents a more extreme form of the textualism and a
continuation of the trend by the Court to accelerate the erosion of
the deference doctrine.273
2. The Supreme Court's questionable textualist approach in Health Care
Professor RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., of Columbia University argues that
the Health Care decision is an example of textualist-friendly justices
failing to apply textualism faithfully and choosing instead to engage
in "hypertextualism." He defines "hypertextualism" as a tech-
nique that finds linguistic precision where it does not exist, that
ignores statutory inconsistencies, and that relies on the abstract
meaning of a word or phrase despite evidence that Congress intended
266. See id. (concluding that Court improperly substituted its own preferred interpretation
of phrase "in the interest of the employer").
267. See id. at 348-50 (analyzing how Court circumvented Chevron).
268. Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
269. See Leading Cases, supra note 177, at 349-50 (describing why and howJustice Kennedy
distorted Chevron test); Merrill, supra note 196, at 353, 357-58 (predicting that textualists will
reformulate first prong of Chevron).
270. See Leading Cases, supranote 177, at 340-50; see also supranotes 167-76 and accompanying
text (discussing Court's questionable interpretation of its holding in Yeshiva Univ. and Packard).
271. See Leading Cases, supra note 177, at 348-50.
272. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1397 (1995) (stating reason behind Court's decision in Health Care).
273. See Leading Cases, supra note 177, at 347.
274. See Pierce, supra note 186, at 751, 759.
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a different result.275 According to Professor Pierce, the statutory
language in Health Care could have supported the majority's construc-
tion.276 Such a construction, however, ignores the context in which
the language was used, thereby violating a major tenet of textualism
and creating a meaning inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a
whole."7 This approach affords even less deference to administra-
tive agencies than existed before the Chevron test.278 The inevitable
result, says Professor Pierce, is "cacophony and incoherence through-
out the administrative state."
279
V. THE NL 'S APPROACH AFTER HEALTH GARE
The NLRB recently decided two nurse supervisory status cases, 8 °
the first such cases since the Supreme Court struck down the
"incidental to patient care" test in Health Care.28' A divided Board
found the charge nurses in question not to be supervisors. 282  The
decisions were long overdue as a backlog of seventy cases dealing with
this issue exists.283
The Board asserted that its new test is merely the same supervisory
test used with other employee classifications, namely "whether such
direction [of other workers] requires the use of independent
judgment or whether such directions are merely routine."284 The
Board further asserted that "[t]his is the approach we have always
used in leadperson cases."2  In adopting this approach, the Board
has linked its new test to the phrase "independent judgment"
because the Supreme Court in Health Care recognized the ambiguity
275. See id. at 752.
276. See id. at 759.
277. See id. (explaining why author believes that Health Care is example of hypertextualism);
see also supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (discussing tenets of textualism including
finding interpretation that avoids statutory inconsistencies).
278. See Pierce, supra note 186, at 751-52 (discussing how hypertextualism has emasculated
Chevron deference).
279. Id. at 752.
280. SeeNymed, Inc., 151 L.RRM. (BNA) 1198 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 2, 1996); Providence Hosp.,
151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1177 (N.L.R.B.Jan. 3, 1996).
281. See Michelle Amber, Divided NLRB Finds Charge Nurses, LPNs Are Not Supervisors Under
NLRA, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at D-4 (Feb. 8, 1996) (reporting on NLRB's first
charge nurse cases since Health Care).
282. See Nymed, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1200; Providence Hosp., 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1179.
283. See Amber, supra note 281, at D-4 (quoting NLRB Executive SecretaryJohnJ. Toner as
to number of cases backlogged and awaiting Board's new test).
284. Nymed, 151 L.1R.M. (BNA) at 1203 (stating that new test is same as test used in other
employee classifications).
285. Id.; see also Providence Hosp., 151 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 1186-87, 1191 (relating policy and
principles behind excluding leadmen and drawing similarity between LPNs and leadmen).
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of the phrase. Apparently, the Board hoped that this recognized
ambiguity would shield the new test from the textualist-driven courts.
Under the new test, the Board holds that "[w]hen a professional
gives directions to other employees, those directions do not make the
professional a supervisor merely because the professional used
judgment in deciding what instructions to give."286 Although
developing a treatment plan involves "substantial professional
judgment," directions to staff who implement that plan usually are
routine.27  The Board drew a tenuous distinction between the use
of judgment in one area of a professional's work, such as creating
treatment plans, and the use of independentjudgment in performing
the statutory duties of a supervisor, such as assigning personnel to
implement the treatment plan.2"s Independent judgment, said the
Board, must be exercised in connection with a section 2 (11) function
if the worker is to be deemed a supervisor.289  Although making
decisions is the "quintessence of professionalism," the Board contends
that communication of those decisions and coordination of their
implementation do not render the professional a supervisor.290
The Board's new test appears to draw a distinction without a
difference. It is one thing to use judgment to think through a
problem, to solve it, and then to routinely assign implementation
tasks to subordinates, but it is quite another thing to use independent
judgment in the actual assignment and direction. The Board has
articulated a rule that unsuccessfully attempts to differentiate between
the use of professional judgment and supervisory "independent
judgment."29  In the end, one cannot distinguish the two forms of
judgment in any satisfactory way. They are essentially the same thing
and any attempt to draw distinctions separating the two is futile.
286. Providen Hosp., 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189-90 (stating that direction to others is not
indicum of supervisory authority just because professional judgment was used in deciding what
instruction to give).
287. See id. (drawing distinction between using judgment to develop patient care plan and
directions given in carrying out plan).
288. See id. at 1190 (stating that distinction exists between use ofjudgment in one area of
professional's work and use ofjudgment in performing statutory duties of supervisor).
289. See id.
290. See id. at 1191 (recognizing that quintessence of professionalism is judgment, but
communication of directions does not necessarily involve such judgment).
291. Cf id at 1187 (discussing difficulties faced in developing new test). The Board
recognized that its task here is difficult because both section 2(11), defining supervisor, and
section 2(12), defining professional, qualify the respective class of workers as those who use
judgment. See id. The goal of the test was to distinguish what quantity of additional authority
renders a charge nurse a supervisor and to do so without taking anything away from the
definition of a professional that would, in the nursing context, have the effect of compromising




Ultimately, the impossibility of drawing such a distinction will
become apparent as the test is applied in future cases. The specious
rebuttal offered by the majority of the Board in response to the
dissent's criticism that the majority ignored the substantial degree of
independentjudgment the charge nurses possessed underscores this
point.92 The majority states that RNs, not just charge nurses,
regularly exercise judgment. 93 "The essence of professionalism
requires the exercise of expertjudgment and the essence of supervi-
sion requires the exercise of independent judgment."2 94  The
question, then, becomes: What is the defining difference? The
intuitive answer is that one form of judgment is more closely linked
to management prerogatives than the other. Grounding that intuitive
answer in the current language of the statute, however, does not seem
possible.
In his dissent, Board Member Charles Cohen confirms the fallacy
inherent in the Board's new test.2 95 He asserts that the Board has
replaced one misinterpretation with another.29 The essence of
independent judgment is that the individual's actions are based on
the thought processes of the individual, rather than on some outside
force or person. 97 Certainly, an individual who makes a "personal
judgment" based on personal experience, training, and ability is
making an independent judgment.
298
The Board cannot escape the fact that the true distinction between
professionals and supervisors, close alignment with management
prerogatives, is not articulable using the existing components of the
statutory definition of supervisor .2  The Supreme Court struck
down what had been the best distinction that incorporated the
292. See id. at 1191 (responding to dissent's criticism).
293. See id.
294. I&
295. See id. at 1197 (Member Cohen dissenting) (discussing majority's new misinterpretation
of NLRA).
296. See id. (Member Cohen dissenting).
297. See id. (Member Cohen dissenting) (challenging majority's interpretation of when
independent judgment is and is not used); Nymed, Inc., 151 L.R.PM. (BNA) 1198, 1208
(N.L.R.B. Feb. 2, 1996) (Member Cohen dissenting) (same).
298. See Providen Hasp., 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1196-7 (Member Cohen dissenting)
(discussing majority's new misinterpretation of NLRA); Nymed, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208
(Member Cohen dissenting) (same).
299. See Providence Hosp., 151 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 1187 (explaining why some assignments are
routine and why others encompass independentjudgment). In reading the Board's explanation,
it appears that the true distinction is really about how close the assignments are to the "genuine
management prerogatives." See id. at 1186-91 (explaining nature of supervisory and routine
assignments).
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existing words in the statute." Twisting the phrase "independent
judgment" does not work. Given that the NLRB's distinction between
professional judgment and supervisory independent judgment is
insupportable by the Act's statutory language, the Board faces the
prospect of the future opposition from textualist-minded courts. The
Board would be well advised to seek an amendment to the NLRA, the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")," or both.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Even if the courts accept the Board's new distinctions between
professional judgment and independent judgment, the Board's test
is not necessarily the best way to address the rise of textualism. To
protect the integrity of the NLRA and, on a larger scale, the integrity
and effectiveness of administrative agencies, legislative amendments
to the NLRA and APA are advisable.
Although many commentators and labor unions recently called for
amending the NLRA's definition of supervisor, few have publicly
offered specific amendatory language. One legal scholar, Professor
Morris, has opined that section 2(3) of the NLRA should be amended
by adding a proviso reading: "Provided, an employee who exercises
managerial or supervisory functions shall not cease to be an employee
by virtue of those functions unless they consume the predominate
part of that person's working time."0 2  Professor Morris believes
that the NLRA is out of step with the emerging models of labor-
management cooperation and such rigid categorizations are only
adding an unnecessarily adversarial element to the workplace."' 3 A
student commentator has suggested adding the following language to
the definition of supervisor: "The term shall not include those
employees who exercise the foregoing authority as a result of
participation in a labor-management cooperative plan in which all
employees have an opportunity to participate.""' Like Professor
Morris, he premises this amendment on his belief that the decentral-
ization of workplaces and the resulting expansion of worker participa-
300. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. CL 1778, 1785 (1994)
(striking down Board's interpretation of "in the interest of the employer").
301. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994).
302. Morris, supra note 177, at 560.
303. See id. at 558-60 (discussing need to amend NLRA to correct courts' unnecessarily rigid
application of statutory definition of supervisor).
304. Joseph B. Ryan, Comment, TheEncouragmentofLabor-Management Cooperation: Improving
Amrican Productivity Through Revisio of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 571,608
& n.169 (1992) (discussing need for revision of NLRA).
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tion in the management and control of the workplace necessitates
such an approach.0 5
This Comment offers yet another possible proposal, that is, revise
section 2(11) by adding: "Professionals or technicals who give
direction to other employees in the exercise of professional or
technical judgment, which is not directly related to formulating or
executing genuine management prerogatives, policies, or business
objectives, is not an exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of
the employer." By amending the statute in this way, the Supreme
Court no longer can misconstrue the term "in the interest of the
employer," and the policy behind the statutory exclusion is stated
directly and thereby effectuated.
Although amending sections of the NLRA will effectuate Congress'
intent as it pertains to professionals, technicals, and supervisors, the
amendments neither protect other reasonable interpretations by the
NLRB of ambiguous language in the NLRA from textualist attacks nor
stop the continual erosion of the deference doctrine. Some commen-
tators maintain that when a plurality of justices, through the use of
textualism, succeeds in making statutory tests conform to its own
ideological preferences at the expense of the doctrinal determinacy
and political accountability accomplished by Chevron, it should be
clear that thejudiciary is incapable of creating reasonably determinate
doctrines of deference."' To remedy this situation, Professors
Shapiro and Levy of the University of Kansas recommend that
Congress compel determinate doctrines by amending the APA to
include them."0 7 Specifically, they propose a new APA section 706
that reads:
The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency actions, findings, and conclusions if the court determines
that
(A) the agency decision violates a constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(B) the agency decision was made without observance of procedure
required by law;
(C) the agency decision violates its statutory mandate or other
statutory provisions because:
(1) the issue has been specifically resolved by explicit statutory
language;
305. See id. at 580, 608-09 & n.169.
306. SeeSidney A. Shapiro& Richard E. LevyJudiciallncentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE LJ. 1049, 1049-72 (1995).
307. See id. at 1071-72 (containing text of proposed amendment).
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(2) the issue has been specifically resolved by legislative history
manifesting an unmistakable congressional intent; or
(3) a contrary interpretation of the statute is unequivocally
required by the traditional tools of statutory construction;
(D) the agency has not offered a valid policy explanation for its
decision because:
(1) it relied on policy concerns that were precluded by statute;
or
(2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem; or
(E) the agency has not offered a logically coherent explanation in
terms of agency expertise, credibility determinations, or policy
considerations, of
(1) why the evidence in the record supports its decision; or
(2) why the contrary evidence does not preclude the deci-
sion.3 08
Although any amendment requires the right political conditions
and is certain to meet with some criticism,3 09 such an attempt is a
valid, vital, and appropriate response to the Court's current
hypertextualist tendencies and will prevent further machinations in
the future. To be certain, the Shapiro and Levy proposal is not
flawless."' They disaggregate the multiple factors the federal courts
use to review agency action."' Without the addition of some
hierarchial scheme, there is no clear guidance as to the proper degree
of deference if the various factors point in different directions.
Nevertheless, the Shapiro and Levy proposal is a necessary first step
in perfecting a workable statutory scheme that will be less malleable
than the current statutory tests.
308. hM
309. SeeRichardJ. PierceJr., Legislative Reform ofJudicialReview ofAgency Actions, 44 DUKE LJ.
1110, 1127-32 (1995) (reviewing Shapiro and Levy's amendment).
310. See id (questioning whether courts will utilize amendments defining adjectives and
adverbs in meaningful manner given courts' tendency to ignore similar language already in
APA).
311. See id. (noting that given Supreme Court's reasoning used in recent statutory
interpretation cases, real possibility exists that certain amendment factors could indicate
resolution of statutory question one way and other factors could indicate contrary resolution).
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CONCLUSION
In Health Care, the Supreme Court improperly invalidated a twenty-
year-old test created by the NLRB. The "incidental to patient care"
test was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase
grounded in legislative history and a wealth of prior case law. In
addition, the NLRB test was true to the policies underlying the NLRA.
The textualist-minded Supreme Court, ignoring all legislative history
and policy arguments, struck down this important test and compro-
mised the organizational rights of thousands of professionals and
further endangered our administrative system. The Health Care
decision represents textualism's continuing deterioration ofjudicial
deference to both Congress and the administrative agencies.
As Judge Wald points out, legislative history is an authoritative
product of the work of Congress and represents the way Congress has
chosen to communicate with the outside world.312 To second guess
Congress' chosen form of communication or to cast doubt on
Congress' ability to ensure that its intent is not compromised arguably
infringes on the separation of powers doctrine.' 3
The textualist movement, quickly evolving into a hypertextualist
movement, must be curtailed. To mitigate the effects of textualism
effectively and quickly in the context of the NLRB's supervisory status
test, Congress should amend the NLRA's definition of supervisor. To
stem the erosion ofjudicial deference to the statutory interpretations
of administrative agencies in general, Congress should amend the
APA to provide courts with a reasonably determinate standard of
deference.
312. See Wald, supra note 5, at 308-09.
313. See i& (arguing that although textualists cite separation of powers doctrine as reason
to avoid using legislative history, textualist approach itself borders on violating separation of
powers doctrine).
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